



The New Turkish General Staff and the Implications for Greek and Cypriot Security

Dr. Harry Dinella

July 29, 2011 marked a signal event in the history of the modern Turkish Republic founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923. On that day, the twenty-seventh Chief of the Turkish General Staff (TGS), General Isik Kosaner, during a meeting with President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Recep Erdogan, resigned. Also present at the meeting and tendering resignations with Kosaner were the chiefs of the Turkish Army, Navy, and Air Force. The entire leadership of the armed forces, perhaps the most respected and organized institution in the country, resigned in one fell swoop.

What the generals hoped to achieve by their surprise resignations is not completely clear. If they wanted to get the country's attention they certainly did, if only for a brief moment. In the past it was almost a political given that in any major confrontation between the country's politicians and its generals, the generals could be counted on to be the last men standing. However, at the end of July, the total opposite occurred. Indeed, it happened so fast that it might have appeared to the casual observer that a coup had actually taken place except in this case it was the civilian political leadership that removed the generals instead of the other way around. Although the generals technically removed themselves, a coup is exactly what occurred. If Kosaner and his chiefs meant their resignations as a gesture intended to galvanize the outrage of the Turkish people on their behalf against the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), they failed miserably. On the other hand, if the mass resignation of the TGS leadership was meant to convey the surrender of military authority to civilian authority, then the generals succeeded brilliantly.

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Perhaps the generals determined they had to take a stand, even a last stand, against a government they have increasingly been at odds with since it came to power in 2002. More significantly, over the years since 2002 a number of skirmishes have occurred between the TGS and the AKP with the soldiers rather than the civilians steadily losing ground. That the secular-oriented TGS would come into ideological conflict with the Islamic-oriented AKP government is no surprise. The generals don't trust the AKP and see the now well-established and powerful party as a threat to the secularism the TGS has so scrupulously protected since the republic's founding. As for the AKP, they see the generals as a threat to civilian government control of Turkey and more specifically their agenda which has been designed to reduce and then eliminate the political power of the TGS.

The great advantage of the AKP is that, unlike previous Turkish governments, it has become more rather than less popular with the passage of time. The popularity of the civilian government is now obvious to the military and the public and today there is no question that the Erdogan-led AKP is more powerful than the generals. Under Erdogan and Gul the AKP has enjoyed not only a growing economy but one electoral success after another, most recently in the summer of 2011. In addition to electoral victories large enough to ensure one-party rule, the AKP's political successes include national referendums, the most recent in 2010, that have changed the 1982 (TGS-written) Constitution at the expense of the military and in favor of the civilian government.¹

In its multi-year struggle to prevail against the military, the AKP has dramatically made Turkey more rather than less democratic in terms of the authority of the country's elected government and in the eyes of the democratic governments of the European Union (EU) that have chastised Turkey in the past for its less-than-perfect democracy. Becoming bolder and more determined over time, the government has taken actions against the military leadership of Turkey that would have been inconceivable just a few years ago. It has dared to accuse, arrest and charge active duty and retired generals and lesser military officers suspected of participating in plots against the government that allegedly date back as far as 2003.² Beginning in 2010 and extending through the summer of 2011, the government has arrested, incarcerated, or temporarily detained hundreds of alleged conspirators in the so-called military-orchestrated "Sledgehammer" plot to overthrow the government.³

The 1982 Constitution which the AKP has been slowly shredding over the years was designed by the TGS to ensure its continuing power in Turkish society and its right to gently guide, or if necessary forcefully compel, Turkey's

politicians not to stray too far from the path of secularism charted by the nation's revered founder, Atatürk. The last time the TGS exercised its heretofore enormous power was in 1997 when it compelled the then leader of the Islamic-oriented Welfare Party, Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan to resign.⁴ For TGS, Erbakan crossed the line with his Islamic-oriented domestic and foreign policies and therefore had to go. Compelling Erbakan to leave office did not require a coup. All TGS had to do was voice its displeasure with the prime minister and his government's policies and Erbakan, recognizing the power of the TGS, left office quietly.

When the once-omnipotent generals resigned last summer their actions hardly caused so much as a ripple in the Turkish cosmic scene. President Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan quickly and calmly selected the Turkish Gendarmerie commander, General Necdet Özel, to serve simultaneously as temporary commander of Turkish Land Forces Command and as acting Chief, TGS until his appointment as chief became permanent a few days later on August. What became clear in the days following the resignations and the uneventful installation of General Özel is that the power and independence of the TGS, the self-appointed guardians of Atatürk's secular, western-oriented revolution, has been broken, probably for good. The political and security implications this change portends for Turkey may be immense and it is not yet clear how this shift in the power structure of the nation will affect Ankara's relations and policies with other countries including Greece and Cyprus, the countries that most fear potential Turkish aggression.

To understand the significance of last summer's resignations one must appreciate the former power of the TGS in general and the power of the Chief, TGS in particular. Unlike military structures in other democracies, the Turkish military has traditionally been almost independent of Turkey's political leadership. The Chief of the TGS commands the entire Turkish military establishment and the service chiefs of the Turkish army, navy, and air force, commanders of the respective services in their own right, come under his direct authority.

Indeed, as late as some years ago and probably still today, there is a framed picture of the Chief, TGS on the desks of each of the service commanders. This, in itself, is not unusual. What is unusual is the type of uniform that the Chief, TGS wears in each of these pictures displayed in the offices of the respective Turkish service chiefs.⁵ Unlike the United States where the top officer in its military establishment can come from any of the services, the Chief, TGS, is always an army officer. However, the picture of the Chief, TGS displayed by the

service chiefs in their individual offices depicts the Chief, TGS not in an army uniform but in the uniform of the respective services. In other words, on the desk of the chief of the Turkish Air Force (TAF) is a picture of the Chief, TGS in a Turkish Air Force uniform as a not-so-subtle reminder to the Chief, TAF that he and the TAF work directly for and under the Chief, TGS. The chief of the Turkish Navy has a similar picture of the Chief, TGS in his office wearing the uniform of the Turkish Navy. Of course, the commander of Turkish Land Forces Command or chief of the Turkish Army, also has a picture of Chief, TGS in his office except in this case, Chief, TGS is in his army uniform. To appreciate the enormous significance of this unusual scheme of authority, one only has to imagine, the quite unimaginable, thought of a picture of General Martin Dempsey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and a U.S. Army officer, on the desk of the chief of staff of the United States Air Force in a U.S. Air Force uniform or on the desk of the Chief of Naval Operations in a U.S. Navy uniform.

In traditional western democracies, the leadership of the military is directly subordinate to the elected civilian government. In the United States, the president is the commander-in-chief. Under the president is the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The entire military establishment of the United States, the Chairman of the JCS, the service chiefs, and the geographic and functional combatant commanders, come under the Secretary of Defense who carries out and is directly responsive to the orders of the president. The combatant commanders, the four-star sword bearers of American military might around the world, take their orders, in peace and war, from the Secretary of Defense rather than from the Chairman, JCS. The American chain-of-command is from the president through the secretary to the individual combatant commanders rather than through the Chairman, JCS, who, in addition to his other duties, is the president's principal military advisor. In America and in other major democracies, the civilians are firmly in charge of the military; something that, at least until recently, has not been the case in Turkey.

The Turkish military structure is unique amongst major NATO countries. Even today, the Chief, TGS, does not come directly under the minister of defense. And, while the TGS and the defense minister constitutionally come under the prime minister in peacetime, the Chief, TGS reports to the prime minister rather than the minister of defense whose job, for all intents and purposes, has basically been to represent the needs of the armed forces with the government and to buy the equipment and supplies the military requires to effect its missions. Traditionally, the Chief, TGS never puts himself in a public position that suggests he is subordinate to the minister of defense.

In contrast, in the United States, it is normal to see the defense secretary hold a press conference in the company of the chairman of the JCS. During the course of such a press conference it is apparent to everyone watching that the chairman, regardless of how much respect the secretary accords him, works for the secretary and not the other way around. During his tenure, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was particularly good at bringing this point home to the American people in the several press conferences he held in joint company with the chairman of the JCS. In Turkey, the defense minister and the Chief, TGS are rarely seen together and they are never seen together in a venue that might suggest, even mildly, that the Chief, TGS is subordinate to the Turkish Minister of Defense. Simply stated, he is not. Therefore, unlike other democracies, command of the entire military structure comes under Chief, TGS.

The authority of the Chief, TGS in war becomes almost total. During wartime the Chief, TGS constitutionally takes up the mantle of national commander-in-chief on behalf of the president, who is Turkey's peacetime rather than wartime commander-in-chief. Why not? It was after all the TGS that wrote the nation's Constitution of 1982 prior to returning Turkey to civilian political control. Indeed, the first post-coup president of Turkey was the former Chief of the TGS, General Kenan Evren, the general who directed the military coup of 1980 and later orchestrated Turkey's return to democracy. The 1982 Constitution was vetted by the Turkish people in a national referendum in November, 1982 that simultaneously elected General Evren to a seven-year term as the seventh President of the Republic of Turkey.⁶

In modern Turkey, it is fair to say that it has been more the prerogative of the military rather than the civilian government to promote the officers that are placed into its higher leadership positions. To be sure, the Constitution gives the president of Turkey the responsibility to appoint the Chief, TGS. However, over time and with rare exception, this has been more of a formality than an actual decision taken by the president.

Traditionally, the future Chief, TGS is pre-selected for the job by the current Chief, TGS ensuring that an heir-apparent is always in place. Pre-selection occurs when a senior general is appointed as the commander of Turkish Land forces Command (TLFC), in other words, as commander of the Turkish Army. Indeed, this tradition of succession was nominally followed by President Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan after the mass resignations in late July. General Ozel, the Gendarmerie commander, had not been never been slotted to become Chief, TGS. The man who had been preselected to replace General Kosaner was the former TLFC commander, General Erdal Ceylanoğlu. Ceylanoğlu, however,

resigned with Kosaner and the other chiefs on July 29, forfeiting his promotion as the next Chief, TGS in the process. General Özel simultaneously assumed command of TLFC when he became acting, Chief, TGS for a few days before officially being appointed by President Gul as the new Chief, TGS on the August 4, 2011. In this sense Ozel is a former commander of TLFC and the tradition that the Chief, TGS is always the former commander of TLFC was therefore maintained.

From this point in time onwards it is apparent that the civilian political leadership of the country will take a more decisive role in appointing future generals to all senior positions in the Turkish Armed Forces and that the government will take an especially active interest in appointing all future TLFC commanders. While the future authority of chiefs of the TGS to influence senior promotions will likely remain substantial, it is almost without question that their recommendations will no longer be virtually absolute. Henceforth, the civilian leadership of Turkey can be expected to increasingly assume the role of other political leaders in democratic nations in determining who the senior military officers at all levels and branches of the Turkish Armed Forces will be. Indeed, the next major step the civilian leadership of Turkey can be expected to make is to subordinate TGS to the Turkish Ministry of Defense.

Since the republic's founding, it has been part of the job of the TGS to ensure that Turkey did not stray from the path of secularism prescribed by Atatürk and revert into what Kemal himself may have most feared, a backward Muslim state influenced by a tradition that would all but guarantee that it could never catch up with the West. Therefore, many analysts and watchers of Turkey believed that the TGS was more a force for the good of Turkish democracy rather than a force against it, even if sometimes TGS seized power from selected civilian governments, as it has three times since 1960, in very undemocratic ways.

In many respects, the military's self-appointed role in protecting secularism placed itself and Turkey into a "Catch-22" situation. This amounted to the fact that the country could not be safe for democratic progress without the military and yet would never be a true democracy in the western sense so long as the military had the power to take over the government whenever it sought to protect Turkish democracy from itself. The one thing that the generals believed and probably still believe is that while it may be possible for a democracy to vote itself into a theocracy, it may not be possible for the people to votes themselves out of one afterwards. In the past, whenever it appeared that Turkish democracy and secularism might be threatened by a return to the old ways, the TGS stepped in to protect Turkey by simply cancelling democracy and taking over the country

until the military created conditions that permitted a return to democratic government under its guidance. The 1982 Constitution empowered the military with considerable authority and influence at the highest echelons of decision making in Turkey. The military's role in government is particularly in the constitutionally mandated National Security Council, a major decision making organ of government in which the military participates in the decision-making process with the elected political leaders of the country. It will be interesting to see if future referendums to amend the Constitution will seek to limit the military's influence and even participation in the powerful National Security Council.

So what went wrong, or as many see it, right, for Turkey this past July? It is certain that the military leadership of the country did not trust the Islamic oriented AKP government led by Erbakan and Gul. It is also certain that the military leadership of Turkey felt itself to be under intense pressure regarding recent government actions against alleged coup plotters in the so-called "Operation Sledgehammer" case that has and continues to result in the arrests or detentions of officers that now number in the hundreds and include former as well as currently serving senior officers.

Why then did the military not orchestrate another coup? Perhaps it wanted to and perhaps by the summer of 2011 it had waited too long to do what it then realized might be either impossible or very bloody to do. Every good military officer understands that it is foolish to give an order that the officer understands might not or will not be obeyed. It must have been apparent to the military that the people of Turkey neither feared nor had become tired of the government that they kept electing. Riots were not occurring in the streets and unemployment was not rampant. Elections were held regularly and in accordance with the Constitution. The economy was, even in this worldwide period of recession, doing well by any standard that the Turkish people had become used to measuring it by in past decades. Rather than another Erbakan being in power, a government that could almost be referred to as pro-business and "Islamic Light" rather than "Islamic Heavy" was in power. Even if the generals believe the government has some hidden agenda to slowly convert Turkey into an Islamic republic, the people apparently do not. One has to give the leadership if the TGS credit for its apparent understanding of the Turkish environment. Therefore, the military leaders of the country did the only thing they could do to voice their displeasure by resigning.

In a way, perhaps the military has fulfilled its purpose of guiding Turkey towards a viable secular society with democratic institutions that can actually

work for Turkey without military oversight. While the military may rue the day, if it does not already, that it did not seize power from the AKP when it could, it may also turn out that they did not have to seize power and no longer have to concern themselves with such things and that henceforth a new generation of officers can take the place of the old guard as the defenders of a democratic Turkey ruled by its democratically elected governments rather than guided by its military establishment. There comes a point when a guardian must let a child that it has carefully raised strike out on its own. Turkish democracy and the Turkish people have had almost a century to mature since the founding of the republic. Perhaps, the hour has arrived for the old guard to do exactly what it did and ride into the sunset.

What do the changes in Turkey portend for Greece and Cyprus? The Greek government and its military establishment perceive the greatest threat to Greek national security as emanating from Turkey. Therefore, it is no surprise that an event like the one that reduced the profile of the TGS in the greater Turkish political scene concerns Greek security planners. The question for Greece is whether Greece is more or less secure as a result of the strengthening of civil government in Turkey.

In comparison to the Greek military, the Turkish military is far and away much larger than its Hellenic counterpart and its weapons are just as modern and, of course, more numerous than Greece's. Turkey has a population of 74 million people while Greece's population stands at a little over 11 million. The Turkish economy with an estimated GDP for 2010 of 960.5 billion dollars is over three times larger than the estimated Greek GDP for 2010 of 305.4 billion dollars.⁷ Moreover, the Turkish economy, despite the worldwide recession, continues to expand while the Greek economy is contracting and expected to remain in dire straits for a number of years to come.

For Greece, a confrontation with Turkey is very much a David and Goliath type of situation except that unlike David, Greece has no slingshot capable of toppling the Turkish Goliath with a single, lucky blow. Since the Cyprus Crisis of 1974 and Turkey's invasion and occupation of 37% of that island, tensions between Greece and Turkey have followed a pattern of ebb and flow and the two countries have come to the brink of war twice, once in 1987 over mineral exploration issues in the Aegean and again in 1996 during the Imia Crisis when the sovereign status of that little islet in the Dodecanese almost triggered a Greco-Turkish war.

Although, overall tensions between Greece and Turkey have lessened since 1996, the issues that continue to divide the two NATO allies are as stark as

ever and can still trigger a crisis that could lead to war on relatively short notice. Turkish military aircraft still violate Greek airspace in the Aegean on a frequent basis. The status of Imia has not been resolved. Turkey has stated that any extension of Greek territorial seas in the Aegean to twelve miles will be considered by Ankara as *casus belli*. Turkey does not recognize Greek claims to a continental shelf for Greek islands in the Aegean.

The TGS understands that a Greek-Turkish war will almost certainly never come about as a result of any Greek initiative to start one. Greece, for its part, cannot afford to assume the same for Turkey, that war will not occur as a result of some Turkish initiative to start one. Both countries realize that the most likely road to a Greek-Turkish war is a crisis that develops as a result of political missteps taken separately by Greece or Turkey or collectively by both countries over one or more of the issues that divide them. A quick road to war between Greece and Turkey might be a crisis that develops over a sovereignty issue concerning territory disputed or claimed by Ankara that Athens believes to be Greek. Imia is a case-in-point that highlights just how easy it might be for a new crisis to develop.

But what of the Republic of Cyprus? A virtually guaranteed road to a Greek-Turkish war would be an attempt on the part of Turkey to increase the amount of territory it already occupies in northern Cyprus at the expense of territory still held by the government of Cyprus. If it is true that Greece does not wish to do anything that might initiate armed conflict with Turkey it is doubly true for the Republic of Cyprus. Simply put, Cyprus cannot be defended against a determined Turkish attack by either the Cypriot National Guard or the Greek military, separately or collectively.

Turkish forces in Cyprus number between 35,000 and 40,000 troops backed by modern tanks and artillery. Moreover, given a distance between Cyprus and Turkey of less than 100 kilometers, the Turkish Air Force and Navy would be expected to provide support to the Turkish land component on the island that would overwhelm the smaller and less adequately equipped Cypriot forces and any Greek reinforcements that might be able to safely arrive on the island. Indeed, Cyprus does not have a navy or air force. The ability of Greece to deploy land, air, and naval forces to Cyprus from mainland Greece or even Crete (almost 800 kilometers distant) in time to rescue Cyprus from a Turkish invasion is not even worth discussing. Greece cannot do it. The best that Cyprus can expect from Greece in terms of military assistance in such a scenario is a token response because Greece does not have a force structure that allows it the luxury of defending Cyprus and Greece at the same time and it is insane to think that

Turkey will permit the transfer of a large percentage of Greek military forces to Cyprus without attacking Greece in the bargain.

This does not mean that Greece would not go to war with Turkey if Ankara invaded Cyprus. Greece is officially committed to Cyprus to do exactly that in the event of a renewed Turkish invasion of that island. The Greek military, however, would be hard-pressed to defend Greek territory, let alone Cypriot territory, in a conflict with Turkey arising over Cyprus. The logic in such a scenario is almost insane. Greece goes to war with Turkey to defend Cyprus except that Greek forces cannot defend Cyprus from a determined Turkish effort to take part or even all of Cyprus. Greek forces instead end up fighting Turkish forces in and over the Aegean and along their mutual border in Thrace. The Greek military has been preparing for war with Turkey for almost four decades and has the wherewithal to defend, most but certainly not all, of Greece. Therefore, in such a scenario, Turkey would probably take as much of Cyprus as it wanted and at least some territory from Greece, perhaps a number of the smaller islands in the Dodecanese before a U.S. or US-EU-NATO-brokered cease-fire could be agreed to.

In short, Greece cannot stop Turkey from taking Cyprus and in the process of fighting Turkey; Greece would almost certainly lose some territory in the Aegean and perhaps in Thrace as well. Given the training, modern equipment and weapons on both sides of the Aegean, not to mention the rampant nationalism that would quickly take hold in a war between traditional enemies, the casualties could be expected to be horrendous for both countries. It goes without saying that Turkey can much better afford to take large casualties than Greece.

It is also fair to say that if Greece can be expected to be dragged into a conflict with Turkey that originated in Cyprus, the same danger applies to Cyprus in the event of a Greek war with Turkey that originated over an Aegean issue having nothing to do with Cyprus itself. In such a scenario, things could be expected to get very bad for Cyprus very quickly. This would especially be the case in the event of any initial Greek successes in a Greco-Turkish conflict that might make Turkey and the TGS look bad in the eyes of the world or worse, the eyes of the Turkish people. One way of mitigating the psychological effects of any Greek successes would be for Ankara to simply fabricate an excuse to invade Cyprus where Turkish military success is all but guaranteed.

There are of course no shortages of hot-button issues between the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey, and new issues can arise on short notice. For instance, in the not too distant future an impasse may develop between Nicosia

and Ankara over Cyprus' desire to begin to exploit the natural gas reserves that are believed to lie within the waters south of the island and within Cyprus' Exclusive Economic Zone. Turkey may not agree and it may claim rights to the gas reserves for itself or on behalf of Turkish-occupied northern Cyprus, the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, recognized only by Turkey. Turkey may suggest that drilling for these reserves be delayed until a final resolution to the island's divided status that can lead its reunification. That could be forever because a speedy resolution of that issue is just not in the cards. Turkey may take the position that it is amenable to "sharing" the reserves. The Republic of Cyprus government probably already feels that it is "sharing" too much of its country with Turkey to begin with and therefore is unlikely to agree to any such suggestion. If Cyprus was bold enough to proceed with exploration and extraction of its reserves against the wishes of Turkey, then Ankara might threaten the use of force. Insofar as Cyprus understands that it can expect no military help from the EU, NATO, or the United States against a Turkish attack, it might feel compelled to once again bow to Turkish threats. But what if it did not?

With no shortage of issues that can translate into crisis situations and even war, is Greece, and for that matter, Cyprus safer with the new power structure in Turkey than it was with the old power structure? The answer is probably yes. It remains the goal of the AKP-led Turkish government to become a full member of the EU. With the retreat or even surrender of the TGS last July, that goal already looks potentially more achievable today than it did before last summer. Moreover, the government of Turkey understands that EU membership will never be possible absent a resolution to the Cyprus problem.

There is no doubt that Prime Minister Erdogan wants to solidify his government's victory over the TGS and in order to do that he requires time and additional amendments to the Constitution of 1982. A primary argument that the AKP successfully used in support of change in the past and an argument that it can be counted upon to use in the future is the necessity to further amend the Constitution in order to make it a document that is better for Turkish democracy and something that the liberal democracies of the EU can embrace rather than reject.

Turkish saber-rattling with Greece or Cyprus pays Turkey no dividends with EU countries who do not threaten each other militarily over the issues that divide them. Indeed, if the right environment can be created, the majority of issues that separate Greece and Turkey actually lend themselves more to reasonable resolution rather than continued strife. Failure to enter the EU

weakens rather than strengthens the power of the AKP to further its “Islamic-Light” agenda and to lead Turkey into a new era of prosperity. On the other hand, continued Turkish animosity with Greece and Cyprus, both EU members, only strengthens the stature of the military and reduces Turkey's chances for EU membership.

Why would Erdogan, who so skillfully engineered the political demise of the military, want to strengthen the stature of the TGS before giving the political glue he used to construct a dominant civilian government time to set? It is a much better policy for Erdogan to let the TGS deal with matters the military is supposed to deal with, like the ongoing insurgency led by the Kurdish PKK for a separate Kurdish state in south-east Turkey.

The TGS has failed to defeat the PKK insurgency in thirty years of conflict. A military approach will not solve this problem any more than a military approach solved the decades-long problem Great Britain had with the IRA in Northern Ireland. Indeed, the political leaders of Turkey probably realize, even if the TGS does not, that the problem with the PKK insurgency will only end with a political rather than a military solution. Until a solution can be arrived at, the insurgency needs to be contained by Turkey's military and paramilitary forces.

If Erdogan can politically solve the Kurdish insurgency it will increase the stature of civilian government in Turkey and remove a substantial threat to Turkish internal security at the same time. Moreover, it will give the EU countries yet another reason to welcome Turkey into their fold. Besides, Turkey needs to begin focusing more on the very genuine and growing security threat posed by a soon-to-be nuclear-armed Iran, a country that is already competing with Turkish interests in Iraq and Syria and one that seeks to establish itself as the regional hegemonic power. Therefore, for the time being, it makes good political sense for Erdogan to let the TGS focus on containing the PKK and the growing threat from Iran. In the meantime, Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey can take advantage of the nature of an expanded democracy in Turkey to move closer together rather than farther apart.

¹“Turkey’s Constitutional Referendum: Erdogan pulls it off,” *The Economist Newsbook*, September 13, 2010. http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2010/09/turkeys_constitutional_referendum.

² Champion, Mark, “Turkey Charges 11 More in Coup Plot” *Wall Street Journal, Europe News*, February 26, 2010. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704625004575088832831112828.html>

³ Champion, Mark, "Turkey Arrests Military Officers in Alleged 2003 Plot" *Wall Street Journal, Europe News*, February 23, 2010.

<http://wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703494404575081721745445404.html>

⁴ Kinzer, Stephen. *Crescent and Star: Turkey Between Two Worlds*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001.

⁵ In the summer of 2001, shortly before his scheduled retirement, I had the privilege of visiting the Chief, of the Turkish Air Force, General Ergin Celasin, at his office in Ankara. During the visit I noted a picture on his desk of a Turkish Air Force officer with epaulettes that appeared to be even more impressive than the epaulettes worn by General Celasin. I asked the general who this was assuming it was some previous chief of the Turkish Air Force. He told me that it was the Chief, TGS, General Hüseyin Kivrikoğlu. General Celasin added that all the service commanders had a picture of the Chief, TGS in their offices wearing the uniform of their respective services.

⁶ "Kenan Evren" Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/kenan-evren.en.mfa> (January 6, 2012).

⁷ Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gr.html>. (January 6, 2012).

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