The Greek Elections of 2012:
The Impact of Closed and Open Electoral Systems on Female Candidates[1]

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The two parliamentary elections held in Greece during 2012 on May 7 and June 17 were the front-page story of every major paper worldwide. Everyone, especially those belonging to countries of the EU, breathlessly awaited the results of the June elections after the Greek members of parliament were unable to form a government following the May election. Even with minute-by-minute coverage of the Greek elections, however, a very important facet of the election process barely received any attention: the type of electoral system used for the elections.

News sources failed to mention that the type of electoral system used for the June election differed from the standard Greek election method used in the May elections. In Greece if an election is held within eighteen months of the previous election, the electoral system changes from an open list system to a closed list system. Looking at the two elections offers insights into the strategies of Greek political parties, particularly with regards to their candidate selection and placement on a district's voting list. One focus of this particular essay will be on how the different systems affected the number of female candidates selected to run for office and the number who won seats in Parliament.

The general theoretical consensus regarding open lists is that they favor the voters' preferences and should keep members of parliament closer to their constituency's wishes. The reasoning is that in open list elections, candidates must align themselves closer with their district voters' needs or some other personal constituency. In contrast, in a closed list election, candidates must align themselves more closely with the national party platform in order to be successful.

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The June closed list election allowed the Greek parties to tighten party discipline on policies critical to dealing with the economic crisis. Candidates adhering to party ideals were placed higher up on the list while disagreeing party members were disciplined by being placed at the lower end of the list. The two elections also provide critical data regarding the number of women chosen for each list and the number subsequently elected to parliament. Over twenty parties ran in both elections, but this study will focus on the seven parties that won seats: PASOK (Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement), New Democracy, SYRIZA (the Coalition of the Radical Left), KKE (Communist Party of Greece), Chrysi Agyi (Golden Dawn), Anexartitioi Ellines (Independent Greeks) and the Dimokratiki Aristera (Democratic Left). None of the other thirteen parties reached the 3% threshold needed to secure sets in Parliament.

In Greece, typical elections are open lists, meaning each party produces a list of eligible candidates for each district and voters choose the specific candidate they want to represent them by placing a cross next to the candidate's name. Each party submits a different list ranging from three to forty-six candidates for each district, depending on the district's size. In a closed list election, voters are only able to select a party rather than individual candidates. Seats are awarded by how many votes the party receives as a whole for that district. The Greek Parliament has 300 seats; 238 are allocated to 56 electoral districts. Twelve of the remaining seats are awarded to parties based on their overall national percentage of votes. An additional 50 seats are awarded to the party with the highest total national vote.

Greek political parties are allowed to run more candidates in each district than there are seats available. According to the Ministry of the Interior "each list may contain as many candidates as there are parliamentary seats in the constituency augmented by two in constituencies where between one and seven Parliamentary Deputies are elected, by three in constituencies where between eight and twelve are elected, and by four in constituencies where more than thirteen are elected."[2] All of the parties that won seats in the May election took advantage of running the maximum number of candidates allowed with the exception of Chrysi Agyi, in a few districts. Therefore, even if a party managed to win all of the seats in a district some of its candidates still would not have necessarily secured a seat, but they might be selected for the 12 nationwide seats or the 50-seat bonus if they represent the winning party.

PASOK and New Democracy have alternated in power since the fall of the junta in 1974. In the last few years, however, the economic crisis has changed that dynamic. SYRIZA has zoomed from being a marginal party to coming in second to New Democracy in the May and June 2012 elections. In addition, many smaller parties that have existed for decades have begun to gain more seats. The radical KKE was established in 1918 but never previously secured many seats in Parliament and the neo-

Nazi party, Golden Dawn, which was established in 1933, did not gain any seats until the May 2012 elections when it won 21 seats. The current debt crisis also resulted in the creation of many new splinter parties headed by politicians formerly in the larger parties who disagreed over solutions offered by those parties. This includes Independent Greeks, which was established by a former New Democracy member who was thrown out of the party for voting against a coalition government and the Democratic Left, which was established by former SYRIZA and PASOK members.

In addition to recent changes to the balance of party power in Greece, there have been changes to dynamics within the parties. Greek political parties from all sides of the spectrum have become divided over the current economic crisis and have experienced fluctuations of party members even in the very short time between the May and June elections. For example, members of the Democratic Alliance suspended their party to run for New Democracy in the June elections. Some members of the LAOS party also defected to run for New Democracy and one former New Democracy member left to join a smaller party, Drassi, just as one leading member of Drassi left to join New Democracy.[3] These defections show that parties struggled to create a platform all of their candidates were willing to campaign under and that the economic crisis has created a lack of party cohesion Greece had never experienced before. Because of the differences in open and closed lists, electoral theory predicts that parties would move disloyal party members lower on the party lists for the closed list election in order to ensure higher levels of party cohesion through the upcoming year.

Another interesting arena in which politics are changing in Greece is the percentage of female participation in the Greek government. Women won the right to vote in 1952 and in the elections following the creation of the post-junta government in 1974, only 2.6% of Parliament was female. This number remained unchanged until 1985. Prior to that year, the female vote went predominantly to the right-wing parties. This changed when PASOK initiated a campaign to promote equality for women and minority groups. As part of its agenda, PASOK pledged to have at least 40% of its candidates be female in every election. Other parties such as the KKE also adopted gender quotas for brief periods of time but then abandoned them, "as they did not yield any significant increases in female participation in government."[4] PASOK still pledges to uphold its quota, but there have never been repercussions when they failed to do so. Female participation in the government remains spotty. As of 2004, PASOK's district lists consisted of 16% female candidates which were still considerably below the 40% goal declared twenty years earlier.

The Rare Opportunity of the Greek 2012 Elections

The Greek elections took place within six weeks of each other, which effectively controls for many variables that previously barred political scientists from drawing

conclusions about the effects of both open and closed list electoral systems. The six-week time frame meant the same pool of voters voted in two elections focused on the same political and economic issues. The main issue for both elections was the failing Greek economy and the proposed EU bailout, with very few other issues in contest between the two elections. Often if a country changes its election rules, so much time will pass that the issues voters are contemplating change dramatically thus having an impact on the election results and skewing the comparisons of the two systems. In addition, parties often have months or years of preparation when switching to another electoral system, which can lead to merging and splitting of parties and other changes in party dynamics. Another advantage of examining two elections within the same country is that all other electoral rules are controlled for as well. The 3% threshold that parties must achieve in order to obtain seats in parliament and 50 bonus seats that are awarded to the party with the most overall votes in order to create "bonus-adjusted proportional representation" system were all maintained for both the open and closed list elections. In short, except for the type of list used, all other electoral rules were held constant between the two elections. Essentially the same Greek voters voted within the same time period on the same issues within the same cultural context.

Another unique opportunity Greece provides is insight into party strategy when moving from a coalition to a party. SYRIZA participated in the open list elections as a coalition of loosely related parties. Greek electoral rules, however, give incentives to groups who run in elections as parties rather than coalitions. Most importantly, in order to be eligible to receive the 50-seat bonus, a group must run as a party rather than as a coalition. With the predictions of such close election results between the top three parties, SYRIZA decided to become an official party for the June 17 elections. This meant that SYRIZA needed to satisfy each group within its party and its transition from coalition to party had the potential to affect which candidates were given priority in order to appease each group.

Party Strategy Results

The datasets presented here were reported by each party and then aggregated at the national level in order to observe any evident patterns of party behavior changing based on the election type. In order to analyze the data, I created a relative rank formula that categorized each candidate as a sure winner, a marginal winner, a marginal loser, and a sure loser based on their position on the party's candidate list. I then analyzed these rankings and calculated how many candidates changed list positions between the two elections in order to see whether the parties altered their candidate ordering strategy based on the change in electoral rules.[5]

National Data	Sure Win		Marginal Win		Marginal Loss		Sure Loss	
Candidates Moved	Up/Down	Total	Up/Down	Total	Up/Down	Total	Up/Down	Total
SYRIZA	0	9	0	40	0	49	30	202
		0%		0%		0%		15%
Anexartitoi Ellines	0	6	0	28	0	35	83	196
		0%		0%		0%		42%
KKE	0	3	3	23	8	26	64	185
		0%		13%		31%		35%
New Democracy	1	33	5	70	14	104	29	183
		3%		7%		13%		16%
Chrysi Agyi	0	3	0	18	0	21	15	78
		0%		0%		0%		19%
PASOK	0	3	0	38	0	41	57	240
		0%		0%		0%		24%
Dimokratiki Aristera	0	2	0	17	0	19	57	175
		0%		0%		0%		33%
National Totals	1	59	6	234	22	295	335	1260
Totals:		2%		3%		7%		27%

PASOK did not move any of its sure winner candidates up or down the closed list, nor did it add or delete any sure winners. PASOK also did not alter the list in any way for candidates who fell into the marginal winner category or the marginal loser category. In contrast, 24% of PASOK's candidates in the sure loser category were moved up or down the lists and 8% were added or deleted from the lists. Only candidates who were at the bottom of the candidate lists were changed in any way. Similar trends were found in all seven parties.

Chrysi Aygi did not alter any of its candidates in the sure winner, marginal winner, or marginal loser categories; only the sure loser category saw any changes with 19% of candidates moved up or down the lists and 14% of these candidates added or deleted from the lists for the closed list election.

Dimokratiki Aristera also had similar findings, with no change to the first three categories, but 33% of sure losers were moved up or down the lists and 10% were added or deleted from the lists.

SYRIZA followed the same trend with 0% of its candidates altered in the sure winner, marginal winner, and marginal loser categories. SYRIZA had a slightly lower percentage of change in the sure loser category than Dimokratiki Aristera; only 15% moved up or down and 6% were added or deleted. SYRIZA had no change in candidates in positions to win seats and very little change in the sure loser category. Based on the electoral systems theory hypothesis, SYRIZA was expected to use take advantage of the opportunity to change winning candidates more so than the other parties because SYRIZA had the added burden of appeasing all of the former coalition parties within its new party structure. SYRIZA, however, not only followed the same trend as all the other parties, it had the lowest percentage of change within its district lists.

The remaining parties, New Democracy, the KKE, and Anexartitoi Ellines had slightly different results but still followed the same trend as the other parties. New Democracy moved one candidate that was a sure winner down the list of its candidates nationwide, creating a 3% change in the sure winner category nationally. New Democracy also moved 7% of its marginal winner candidates up or down but did not add or delete any of them. Of the marginal loser category, New Democracy moved 13% up or down and added or deleted 10% of the candidates nationwide. In the sure loser category, the percentages get higher with 16% of candidates moved up or down and 19% of candidates added or deleted.

The KKE did not remove any sure winners but altered candidates in the marginal winner, marginal loser, and sure loser categories. In the marginal winner category, the KKE moved 13% of its candidates up or down but did not add or delete any candidates. In the marginal loser category 31% of candidates were moved up or down, but none were added or deleted. In the sure loser category 35% of candidates were moved up or down, and 2% were added or deleted.

Anexartitoi Ellines did not move any sure winners but altered candidates in the marginal loser and sure loser categories with 11% of their marginal losers added or deleted and no candidates moved up or down. In the sure loser category, 42% of candidates moved up or down and 14% were added or deleted. My research was limited to parties who won seats in the open elections, but as I analyzed each district I also observed similar trends in smaller parties who did not receive enough votes to overcome the 3% threshold.

Overall, every party had a similar trend of few to no candidates changing in the sure winner category, a small number of candidates changing in the marginal winner category, a larger number of candidates changing in the marginal loser category, and the largest number of candidates changing in the sure loser category. This trend is seen in both candidates moving up or down the lists and being added or deleted, but

candidates were moved within the lists at a higher percentage than the number of candidates being added or deleted from the district lists. Of all of the candidates who won seats, only 2% had been changed in rank by party leaders for the closed list election in June. However, of all the candidates who lost in the open election 32% of them were shifted in the order or exchanged completely. Regardless of party size or party goals going into the closed election, all parties left their winning candidates intact and made changes to their losing candidates. The farther down the list a candidate fell in the open elections, the more likely the candidate shifted rank or was removed from the list for the closed elections. In conclusion, the parties did not behave as predicted through open and closed list electoral theory. In addition, the time constraint hypothesis stating that such a short time lapse between elections would have prevented parties from altering their lists was false. Instead, the data shows the same trend in party strategy across all seven parties based on the performance of candidates in the May elections. The parties used the open list election as a primary for the winning candidates and ranked them from best May election performance to worst for the June list orders. Of candidates listed in the May elections, 32% either had their rank changed on the list or they were exchanged for a new candidate. Parties choose to leave the winning candidates alone but altered the losing candidates who fell into the marginal and sure loser categories.

My data indicates that candidates were shifted lower on the lists as part of a party's strategy to gain more votes. For example, candidate Sotirios Vahaviolos was added as the ninth candidate for PASOK on a party list that only had a chance of winning one or two seats. Vahaviolos is an American citizen and the CEO of a highly successful company based out of New Jersey. According to WNYC news, he was added as a candidate for the closed election as a "symbolic" gesture as an attempt to convince Greeks living abroad in the United States that PASOK cares about their needs and is willing to run candidates who represent them. A candidate selected to run for New Democracy in the closed list election, Artemis Papadatou of New York, claims she was selected to run because New Democracy wanted her to "represent the young generation, to bring in the new and out with the old."[6] The claims made by these parties stating they were trying to represent citizens abroad and the younger generations was a party strategy to gain votes they might not have normally secured by using the closed list elections to their advantage. The parties placed these candidates low on the lists, knowing they did not have a chance of securing a seat. The parties would not employ this strategy during the open list election because these candidates could be selected directly by voters and win a seat. The closed list elections allowed parties to use the lower list candidates to gain voters without making any changes to their parliamentary makeup.

Evidence for this type of party strategy is found in the voter turnout statistics for the May elections. Voting is mandatory in Greece, yet many people abstained from voting in the May elections as a protest against the decisions of the major parties decisions regarding the debt crisis. Voter turnout hit a record low of 65% in the May elections, a huge drop in voter participation for a country that has routinely seen turnout levels above 75% since the 1950s.[7] The large parties knew their chances of winning in the next election were going to come down to a small percentage of voters, and small parties faced a similar challenge regarding the chance of becoming a coalition partner. While the parties used the May elections as a primary for winning candidates, they did not need to employ this strategy for the losing candidates. Instead, they replaced nearly one third of these candidates in an effort to pull in unlikely voters such as Greeks of the Diaspora or younger voters. These new candidates were asked to campaign for their party and encourage voters to make the trip to the polls in order to regain many voters who refused to vote in May.[8] These symbolic candidates were intended to show new voter demographics that their interests were of concern to the party. This tactic, however, was unsuccessful as voter turnout decreased to 62.5% for the June election.

Female Representation Results

By reviewing the lists for the May and June elections, we can determine the effect of closed and open lists on female candidates. Female candidates were easily identified because in Greek, women's names end in e, i, or a, and there are no names that are ambiguously male or female. A key element in judging the list is not only how many women ran for office for the top parties, but also how many of them were sure winners, marginal winners, marginal losers, and sure losers in the open list elections and how many shifted positions in the closed list election.

At the national level during the open list election in May, female candidates made up 14% of candidates who were sure winners, 18% of marginal winners, 31% of marginal losers, and 40% of sure losers. In the closed elections, female candidates made up 14% of sure winners, 18% of marginal winners, 30% of marginal losers, and 41% of sure losers. Overall parties generally followed the trend of a few female candidates in the sure winner and marginal winner categories and an increase in female candidates when moving to the marginal loser and sure loser categories. Although all of the parties had 33% to 40% of their lists consisting of female candidates, that number is deceptive considering a majority of those female candidates having little to no chance of winning a seat. The numbers of female candidates increased as the likelihood of winning a seat decreased. Below are national totals by party of female candidates in the May and June elections of 2012:

May

May	Sure Win		Marginal Win		Marginal Loss		Sure Loss	
	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total
Syriza	1	9	13	40	25	49	60	202
		11%		33%		51%		30%
Anexartitoi Ellines	0	6	8	28	14	35	74	196
		0		29%		40%		38%
KKE	2	3	5	23	8	26	81	185
		67%		22%		31%		44%
New Democracy	4	33	9	70	19	104	97	183
		12%		13%		18%		53%
Chrysi Aygi	1	3	0	18	8	21	32	78
		33%		0%		38%		41%
Pasok	0	3	3	38	10	41	103	240
		0%		8%		24%		43%
Dimokratiki Aristera	0	2	6	17	8	19	60	175
		0%		35%		42%		34%
National Totals	8	59	44	234	92	295	507	1260
		14%		18%		31%		40%
		14%		18%		31%		40%

June

June	Sure Win		Marginal Win		Marginal Loss		Sure Loss	
	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total
Syriza	1	9	13	40	25	49	57	202
		11%		33%		51%		30%
Anexartitoi Ellines	0	6	8	28	14	35	75	196
		0%		29%		40%		38%
KKE	2	3	4	23	8	26	82	185
		67%		17%		31%		44%
New Democracy	4	33	10	70	17	104	99	183
		12%		13%		16%		54%
Chrysi Aygi	1	3	0	18	7	21	34	78
		33%		0%		33%		44%
Pasok	0	3	3	38	10	41	99	240
		0%		8%		24%		41%
Dimokratiki Aristera	0	2	6	17	8	19	65	175
		0%		35%		42%		37%
National Totals	8	59	44	234	89	295	511	1260
		14%		18%		30%		41%

Overall, in both the open and closed list elections the KKE's lists were 40% female, which was the highest percentage of female representation of all seven parties. In the sure winner category, the KKE had the highest percentage of female candidates at the national level at 67%. This did not change going into the closed list elections. However, their percentage of female candidates decreased from 22% in the marginal winners category to 17% in the closed list elections. Their marginal loser category was 31% female and remained that way for the closed election, as did their sure loser category with 44% female candidates.

The party with the next highest percentage of female candidates in the sure winner category was Chrysi Agyi with 33%. However, no candidates in the marginal winner category were female in either election. The percentages for the marginal loser category were 38% female participation in the open list election and a decrease to 33% in the closed list election. The sure loser category had the highest percentage of women, with 41% in the open list election and 44% in the closed list election. Overall, Chrysi Aygi's candidates were 33% female in both the open and closed list elections.

Only two other parties had any female candidates in the sure winner category: New Democracy and SYRIZA. Twelve percent of New Democracy's sure winners were female and the percentage did not change in the closed list election. New Democracy had slightly higher percentages of female candidates in the marginal winner category with 13% in both elections and 16% in both elections in the marginal loser category. There was a huge increase in female candidate percentage from the marginal loser to the sure loser category, with 53% female candidates in the open election and 54% in the closed election.

In the sure winner category for SYRIZA, 11% of candidates were female in both the open and closed list elections. There was a large increase in female candidates from the marginal winner to marginal loser category, with 51% female candidates. The sure loser category had a lower percentage of female candidates with only 30%. In total, SYRIZA's candidates were 33% female in the open and closed list elections.

Anexartitoi Ellines had no female candidates in the sure winner column. The candidates in the marginal winner category were 29% female in both elections. There was a 10% increase in female candidates from the marginal winner category to the loser categories. 40% of Anexartitoi Ellines' marginal losers were female in both elections and this percentage stayed relatively consistent in the sure loser category with 38% female candidates. In total, the party ran lists that were 36% female in both the open and closed list elections.

Dimokratiki Aristera had similar statistics to Anexartitoi Ellines, with no females in the sure winner category for either election. This percentage jumps to 35% in the

marginal winner category and is consistent in both elections. There was a 7% increase in female candidates from the marginal winner to marginal loser categories, with 42% female candidates in the marginal loser category. There was an increase in female candidates in the sure loser category from the open to closed list election, with 34% female candidates in the open election and 37% female candidates in the closed election. Overall, 35% of the candidates Dimokratiki Aristera ran in the open election were female and this increased slightly to 37% female candidates in the closed election.

PASOK did not have any female candidates in the sure winner category. In the marginal winner category, 8% of their candidates were female in both elections. There was a 16% increase in female candidates from the marginal winner category to the marginal loser category, which had 24% female representation. This number increased again by 19% from the marginal loser category to the sure loser category, with 43% of the candidates being female in the sure loser category in the open election. There was a slight decrease in female candidates in the sure loser category for the closed election with 41% of PASOK's candidates being female in this category. In total, 36% of PASOK's candidates were female in the open election and 35% of its candidates were female in the closed elections. The graph which follows depicts the percentage of female candidates in each category for the open list election in May and the closed list election in June. The graph shows the percentage of female candidates increased as the likelihood of the candidate winning a seat decreased. The graph also shows there was little change in the percentage of female candidates from the open to closed list election in any of the rank categories and no change in the percentage of female candidates overall.

National Percentage of Female Candidates by Relative Rank Category for May and June Elections 2012

The percentage of female participation from the May to June elections was not affected by the change from open list elections to closed list elections. Even though candidates lower on district lists were more likely to be either moved or added or deleted, the percentage of female candidates remained constant even in the marginal and sure loser categories where there was a 32% shift in these candidates overall. A few parties had only a few percentage points difference in the open to closed lists when it came to female participation even though they had a large change in candidates at the lower rank categories. For example, PASOK only had a 2% decrease in female candidates in the sure loser category from the open to closed list election, yet 24% of the sure loser candidates had been added or deleted from the list going into the closed list election. This phenomenon is explained by the fact that every party made sure to replace a female candidate with another female candidate if they chose to remove the candidate from the May election from the list.

Even though there was a high percentage of candidate turnovers in the loser categories, every party made sure to keep the percentages of female candidates consistent. The same held true for male candidates. If a party chose to replace a male candidate, another man replaced him. While parties were willing to change candidates for other purposes, perhaps for ideology or ability to reach new voter demographics, they were not willing to change the ratio of female to male candidates. If a female candidate won a seat in the open list election, she was essentially guaranteed the same position on the closed lists. If a female candidate lost in the open list elections, she was not guaranteed security of her place on the closed list, but the party made sure that even if this candidate was removed, another female candidate would replace her. While female candidates were not helped by the change in electoral rules, they were not hurt by them either, even though parties could have taken advantage of the closed list and replaced the female candidates with male candidates.

Female Candidate Results: Winning and Losing Parties

PASOK did not meet its own 40% quota on the national level. In total, 35% of PASOK's candidates were female in the open list election and 33% were female in the closed list election. Although this is almost double the percentage of female candidates recorded in 2004, PASOK was still not successful in achieving its 40% quota thirty years after it became the leading party in the fight for women's rights.

At the district level, PASOK only met the 40% quota in 11 of the 56 districts in the open list election. In the closed list election only 12 district lists of the 56 districts contained over 40% female candidates. In five districts PASOK did not run a single female candidate in either election. Ironically, despite PASOK being the lone party in pledging to a quota to raise female participation in these elections and parliament, PASOK was not the party with the highest percentage of female candidates or even the

second highest. Both New Democracy and the KKE had much higher percentages of female candidates on their lists in both elections. Even SYRIZA, which had the lowest overall percentage of female candidates, still had a higher percentage of women in the sure winner and marginal winner categories than PASOK. Moreover, PASOK did not have any more women elected to Parliament than the other parties.

In total, 1,061 of 3,087 candidates were female in the open list election, while 1,072 of 3,088 candidates were female in the closed list election, which comes to 34% in the open list election and 35% in the closed list election. According to the Greek ministry election results, 19% of Parliament after the May elections was female and this number increased slightly to 21% of Parliament after the June elections.

The Greek government has recognized these party initiated quotas have not produced the results they hoped for. In early 2012, a new law was approved mandating that 30% of candidates on every district list must be female. This law will not take effect until 2016. Every one of the top seven parties currently meets this 30% quota. This law, however, also decrees that every party must run enough female candidates in every district to account for 30% of each district list. Many parties fall desperately short of this quota at the district level. A number failed to run even a single female candidate in some of the smaller districts.

Districts with the lowest percentages of female candidates were primarily one and three seat districts where a party's list consists of a maximum of three and five candidates respectively. Districts with the highest percentages of female candidates included the three largest districts: Athens District A, Athens District B, and Thessaloniki District A. This group however, contains small one to five seat districts as well, so the data did not show conclusive evidence for a connection between district magnitude and the number of female candidates.

Conclusions

Conventional electoral theory indicates the open lists for the May election and the closed lists for the June election should have consisted of a different ordering of candidates or new candidates who did not run in the May elections. In case of these Greek elections, conventional theories did not predict the outcomes observed. From the open list to closed list elections, only 2% of candidates elected to parliament in the open list election were moved on the closed lists. In contrast, 32% of candidates who lost in the open list election either changed list placement or were exchanged for a new candidate. In total, 569 candidates in the marginal and sure loser categories were moved within the lists and 139 candidates were exchanged from the May to June elections. The political parties were not willing to completely disregard the opinions of voters, even when they had a legal pathway to do so for the sake of creating a more cohesive government. Instead, these parties used the open list election as a primary of sorts in

order to determine which candidates should be highly ranked in the closed list election. The parties' cost-benefit analysis indicated that a change in winning party candidates could be too risky in a time of crisis; they could not risk losing any more voters than they already had in the May elections.

Every party, regardless of political orientation or size used the same strategy. Winning candidates were left untouched and many losing candidates were replaced with new candidates to be used as a get-out-the-vote strategy. It will be interesting to observe whether these "symbolic" candidates inserted low on the June district lists will become substantial members of these parties in the future. With such disillusionment with the current politicians due to their mishandling of the debt crisis, there could be an opportunity for these former symbolic candidates to move up in party rankings and become the forefront of these parties.

Scholars argue that closed list elections benefit women because parties can move them up the lists in order to get elected, while in open list elections the decision is completely up to the voter as to how many female candidates get elected to the Parliament. The Greek data shows the closed list election did not affect the percentages of female candidates as electoral theory indicates it would. In both elections 35% of candidates were women and in the open election 19% of Parliament was made up of women and after the closed list election this percentage only increased to 21%. While the time constraint could have explained why there was no shift in female candidates and only a small shift in female parliament members, parties did have enough time to change the lower portions of their lists, which indicates that the time constraint was not a factor affecting party strategy.

The research indicates that closed list elections alone are not sufficient to increase female participation in Parliament. The only way a closed list election would increase the numbers of female candidates elected to office is to pair it with quotas that mandate a certain number of females must run for office for each party or that lists must be "zipped" meaning that every other candidate must be a woman. However, Greece does not have these mandates in place and they bring up an array of dilemmas regarding voter preference. If the closed lists are intended to improve female representation in Parliament, absent a mass popular movement, these additional laws must be implemented in order to see any improvement. Greek political parties currently are not prepared to meet the new 30% female candidate quota to be installed in 2016. No party was successfully over the 30% quota in every district, and all parties had districts where they did not run a single female candidate. Serious political parties need to begin planning for this change now if they are to successfully achieve this quota as meeting the quota will require recruiting a large number of new female candidates.

The same principles learned from the female representation data in the case of the Greek May and June 2012 elections can also be applied to using closed list electoral systems to increase other types of minority groups. Without additional incentives and absent mass movements, parties will have no reason to increase the numbers of minority candidates. The female representation data also shows that even in areas with high numbers of female participation in the elections, parties have no incentive to place female candidates high up on closed lists. Participation seemed high on paper but in reality, few of these women had a chance of being elected. This is another obstacle to consider when creating supplementary rules to increase female and minority representation in Parliament. Not only must these laws create incentive for parties to run women and minority groups at a percentage representing the greater populace, but they must also create incentive for parties to place these candidates high enough on their district lists so they have an opportunity to be elected to office.

The data, however, also shows that parties ensured their female candidates who won a seat in the open list election had the same placement on the closed lists in June. In addition, parties took meticulous care to ensure that if they decided to remove a losing female candidate from the list, another female candidate replaced her. This strategy was a consistent pattern of all seven parties. Although the parties could have replaced female candidates with male candidates, the cost-benefit analysis indicated that the female vote was too valuable to the parties to risk alienating female voters. This is an important step for Greece, a country where women have only had the right to vote for 61 years and opinion polls show that up until recent generations became of age to vote, women considered voting and politics strictly a man's pastime and thus very little attention was paid to the needs of female voters.[9] While Greece still falls short of equal representation of both genders in Parliament, the attention to maintaining the percentages of female candidates from the open to closed list election shows parties are beginning to realize how important the female vote could be for their party's success.

Countries looking to improve their percentages of female parliamentary representatives must understand that in order to see quick improvement, a closed list electoral system needs additional laws equipped with disciplinary action if they are not enforced. The case of PASOK and its self-declared 40% quota shows that these types of mandates are extremely slow to yield results unless there are consequences if the quotas or other laws are not met. PASOK knew it would not suffer any consequences if it did not meet the 40% quota, so it used this quota pledge to gain female votes without having upheld its promise. In addition, Greece outsources its election results data to an outside company and any data that is not imperative to determining seat winners are not collected. Therefore, the odds of PASOK being held accountable to its quota was very slim. While the Greek closed list elections did not increase female representation, it did indicate that political parties do take female voter preference into account when

creating party strategy and if this effort to keep female voters engaged in politics continues, Greece has the potential to make great strides toward equality in a short span of time.

The outcomes of both elections were extremely similar and the supposed benefits of a closed list election did not occur. The costs of switching the election rules could be higher than the benefits. The only other time Greece used a closed list election was in 1989. Consequently, voters were not familiar with the closed list process. A responsible government would most likely need to take the time to educate voters as to how to vote using these new election rules during a crisis. The only benefit a closed list election still offers over an open one is that tallying votes is a much quicker process. Greece, however, does not have a problem with rapidly tallying votes for the open list election, so tallying of votes does not seem to be a credible reason to completely alter the voting system if elections must be held within 18 months of each other.

The findings of this study are important for Greece because its desperate need to create a strong, cohesive government in its time of need could be affected by its electoral system decisions. Choosing an electoral system that fits the needs of a country is crucial to creating a government that can give its country what it needs. If the theories behind the logic of choosing one electoral system over another are incorrect, this could lead to an inability of a government to function as designed or failure to even form a government. The Greece case provides interesting insight into shifts in party strategy when faced with a transition from an open list to a closed list system. A country needs to not only consider the logic behind all electoral system theories before choosing a new electoral system but also assess the real life applications of these electoral systems.

The Greek case shows that seemingly stark differences in where the power lays in open and closed list systems may not be as we assumed. Theorists such as Gallagher and Mitchell state that closed list elections leave the power with the parties while open list elections gives more power to the voters.[10] However, this theory does not take into account the ease in which voters can abstain from voting or select another party in a closed list election if the party does not put candidates to their liking high on their district list. The ultimate decider of winners and losers in a functioning democratic system is the voter, regardless of an open list or closed list configuration, and parties know that they must appease their constituency in order to gain seats regardless of the electoral system.

While many variables were held constant between the two elections in Greece, the nation was in a crisis of historically unprecedented proportions, which could have affected the data. Greece will return to the open list system for its next election, so parties did not have an incentive to completely change their party strategy for only one election, which also could have affected the data. Closed list elections in Greece have

been extremely rare, but they will become more common if the debt crisis continues to create instability. My research can be helpful in observing patterns of party behavior in the future during closed list elections in Greece and perhaps help pinpoint the causes of these patterns. In addition, the female participation data will become crucial once the 30% quota comes into effect in 2016. My current findings provide baseline data to test whether these quotas will be effective in increasing the number of female candidates and the number of female parliament members. The data by district can also provide information as to whether certain districts will have an easier time increasing levels of female participation in elections based on district demographic. The Greek Ministry of the Interior website has minimal statistics regarding the results of the May 2012 election and absolutely no statistical analysis of the June 2012 election. In addition, the International Organization of Parliaments, an organization that maintains statistics of all parliamentary democracies worldwide, is also missing all of this data in its database. Hopefully my data and research will provide insight as to how parties react to changes in the electoral system and provide a baseline for observation of the changes in percentage of female candidates and party strategy in open and closed list elections in the future.

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[1] This essay is a condensed excerpt from my Senior Honors Thesis submitted to the Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego. The longer version examines the theories regarding closed and open electoral systems in greater detail. It also places the Greek case into a multi-national complex. For purposes of this journal, I have focused on the Greek case exclusively with concern about female candidates.

[2] Ministry of the Interior, 2012.

[3] radiobubble.gr, 2012.

[4] Maro Pantelidou Maloutas, *The Gender of Democracy: Citizenship and Gendered Subjectivity*. London: Routledge, an imprint of Taylor & Francis Books Ltd., 2006: pp. 36-64.

[5] I created a relative rank category using the following formula of my own design with inspiration from previous work done by Matthew Shugart. Categories are calculated by dividing each candidate's placement on the list by the number of seats the party won. Each category was then assigned a range. If a candidates' relative rank was from 0 to 0.5, they were a sure winner, from 0.5 to 1.0 was a marginal winner, from 1.0 to 2.0 was a marginal loser, and candidates receiving a rank above 2.0 fell into the sure loser category. The marginal winner cutoff of 1.0 is a clear dividing line because a candidate receiving a rank of 1.0 was the last candidate on that list to win a seat. The dividing point of 0.5 between sure and marginal winners is designed to estimate where winners who safely won a seat separate from the winning candidates who barely won a seat. The dividing point of 2.0 between marginal and sure loser categories provides an estimate of where losing candidates transition from having a small chance of winning a seat to almost no chance of winning a seat. The range of marginal loser and sure loser are larger categories because in every district parties add a great deal more candidates than are likely to be elected so these loser rankings have far more candidates to sort than the winner rankings.

[6] Stan Alcorn, *In Much Anticipated Greek Elections, Candidates from NY, NJ Land on Ballot*. New York Public

Radio. WNYC 93.9, New York City, New York, June 15, 2012.

[7] Drude Dahlerup, *Increasing Women's Political Representation: New Trends in Gender Quotas.* Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 2005, pp. 54-72.

[8] Alcorn, Much Anticipated Greek Elections.

[9] Maloutas, *The Gender of Democracy.*

[10] Michael Gallagher and Paul Mitchell, *The Politics of Electoral Systems. The Politics of Electoral Systems.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 3-25, 333-375.

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