

Why Macedonia Matters

Panayiotis Diamadis

With the formation of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) in 1991, there has been a systematic effort to undermine the legitimate rights of the Greek state, particularly of Hellenes in the Greek Province of Macedonia. Selectivity, omission, and distortions of the past by FYROM have become routine. This extensive campaign of disinformation is aimed at undermining the legitimacy of the present borders. Motivating the arguments about history, language, culture, religion, identity and heritage is a struggle for control of the strip of territory between the Aemos (Balkan) Mountain range and the Aegean Sea, the land of Macedonia.

Since earliest antiquity, the people to the north of the mountains have sought control over the fertile plains, strategic ports and mineral resources of Macedonia. In the twenty-first century, this continues to be the case. Despite FYROM's endeavors to present the Macedonian issue as being about human rights, it is about territory and power. While Greece and Bulgaria have somewhat resolved their differences over access to the Aegean Sea through the framework of the European Union, land-locked FYROM has resisted all efforts to reach similar accommodation with any of its neighbors. The Macedonian issue, therefore, is not just a bilateral problem between Greece and FYROM. Bulgaria is just as concerned about the policies of governments in Skopje that endeavor to falsify the historical record and de facto challenge its established borders as well as those of Greece.

Since the coming to power in 2006, the VMRO-DPMNE (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization—Democratic Party for Macedonia National Unity) government of Nikola Gruevski has pursued a policy of *Antikvizatzija* (Antiquisation).¹ This has included renaming 240 streets in Skopje; and party officials state there is a list of about 1,000 new name changes in the pipeline “that fit the ruling party's nationalist ideology.” The name changes are a blatant effort to appropriate Hellenic history. Changes in the names of streets, boulevards and plazas include *Macedonia, Macedonians, Great Alexander, Philip, Amynta, Perdika, Ptolemy, Cleopatra, Aegean, Macedonian Phalanx, Cyril and Methodius, Thessaloniki, Serres, Drama,*

Dr. Panayiotis Diamadis is a Lecturer in Genocide Studies at the University of Technology, Sydney, Australia. Specializing in the Hellenic, Armenian and Assyrian Genocide, he has an extensive record of publications, conference papers and public lectures in Australia and Europe.

and *Kastoria*. Commentators on these alterations note that they are “designed to fit the government ideology that today’s Slavomacedonians are the heirs to the Macedonian Hellenes of antiquity.”²

Statues of ancient monarchs Philip II and Alexander III (‘the Great’) have been erected in several cities across the country. The most controversial one is a 22-meters tall equestrian monument of Alexander astride Bucephalas³ in Skopje’s central plaza erected in 2011.⁴ An even larger statue of Philip is under construction at the other end of what is now Macedonia Square but was formally Marshal Tito Square. Alexander also adorns the town squares of Prilep and Štip, while Monastiri (Bitola) boasts a statue of Philip II. In January 2012, a 21- meters high triumphal arch, the *Porta Macedonia*, was unveiled in the same vicinity. Officially dedicated to the twentieth anniversary of the country’s independence, its exterior features 193 square meters of marble *bas-reliefs* of historical figures, including Alexander. *Antikvizatzija* has led Skopje to being labeled “Disneyland” and “the kitsch capital of the Balkans” by international media.⁵

The *antikvizatzija* policy is not restricted to monuments. Antique objects moved from archeological museums are displayed at major infrastructure sites to cultivate the identification of the modern Slavic-Albanian state with Hellenic antiquity. The country’s two international airports have been renamed *Skopje Alexander the Great Airport* and *Ahrida (Ohrid) Saint Paul the Apostle Airport*. The main thoroughfare to Hellas is *Alexander III the Macedonian Highway* and Skopje’s largest stadium is *Philip II Arena*.

The *antikvizatzija* policy originated amongst extreme expatriate groups particularly in Australia.⁶ These groups include the Australian Macedonian Human Rights Committee (AMHRC, formed 1984) and United Macedonian Diaspora (UMD, formed 2004). Arising from a stridently anti-communist political movement amongst the Slavomacedonian diaspora, from the 1980s, there has been a concerted effort to distance their identity from the reality of the medieval Slav settlement in the region while simultaneously identifying with antiquity.

Under *antikvizatzija*, medieval figures such as the Bulgarian tsars such as Symeon and Samuil and Hellenic figures such as Saints Cyril and Methodius are targeted for absorption into the Slavomacedonian pantheon. The policy also claims modern figures considered national heroes in Bulgaria, such as Dame Gruev and Gotse Delchev. These actions drew intense criticism from Bulgaria. In a statement issued in August 2012, Bulgarian Foreign Minister Nikolay Mladenov reacted strongly to anti-Bulgarian hate speech in the media in Skopje and made it clear that FYROM’s bid for membership of EU and NATO were conditional on FYROM showing “good neighborliness” and abandoning its rhetoric against Greece and Bulgaria in particular.⁷

Antikvizatzija is also criticized domestically as dangerously dividing the country between those who identify with classical antiquity and those who identify with the country's Slavic culture, which originated in the medieval period. Albanians and other Muslim minorities see it as an attempt to marginalize or even exclude them from the national narrative altogether. This ethnic problematic is also found in textbooks by FYROM academics. Although they make no claim that that modern Slavomacedonians are related to ancient Hellenic Macedonians, they say little about the Albanians who make up at least a third of the FYROM population.⁸ Currently FYROM has a population of a little over two million. According to the latest (highly disputed) Census, 64 per cent (approximately 1.2 million people) are "ethnic Macedonians" (non-Greek) with the remaining 36 per cent being primarily Albanians, with a small number of other Christian and Muslim groups. Greek Macedonia, in contrast, has a population of 2.6 million, overwhelmingly ethnic Hellene Macedonians, with small groups of Jews, Armenians and Muslims.

While the efforts to distance the Slavomacedonians from their Slavic ancestry and identify them with the Macedonian Hellenes of antiquity have achieved new heights under the Gruevski government, this revisionist approach was not always the case. In the aftermath of FYROM's September 1992 declaration of independence from federal Yugoslavia, noted anthropologist Milos Konstantinov told the *Toronto Star* newspaper that "present day Macedonia claims no blood connection to ancient Macedonia."⁹ His statement echoed the thoughts of Kiro Gligorov, the first President of FYROM, who readily acknowledged that, "We are Slavs who came to this area in the sixth century (AD)... we are not descendants of the ancient Macedonians."¹⁰ In a second *Toronto Star* interview a month later, Gligorov repeated, "We are Macedonians, but we are Slav Macedonians. That's who we are! We have no connection to Alexander the Greek and his Macedonia. The ancient Macedonians no longer exist; they had disappeared from history long time ago. Our ancestors came here in the fifth and sixth century AD."¹¹ Former Prime Minister and VMRO party leader Ljupcho Georgievski expressed the same sentiments in *This is Me*, an autobiography published in 2012 where he stated the "(Slavo)Macedonians are the biggest counterfeiters of Balkan history" and that they would dearly regret "renouncing St. Clement and St. Naum."¹² Five years earlier Georgievski had written in his *С лице към истината (Facing the Truth)*, "Why be ashamed and flee from the fact that everything that is positive in the Macedonian revolutionary tradition comes exactly from the Exarchate share of the Macedonian people. You would not say a new truth if you mention the fact that Gotse Delchev, Dame Gruev, Gjorce Petrov and Pere Toshev - must I list all of them - were teachers of the Bulgarian Exarchate in Macedonia."¹³

The long term goal of *antikvizatzija* is the same as that of its communist predecessors: the creation of a "Greater Macedonia" that incorporates large parts of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Albania. Realization of such a plan would have major and

unpredictable ramifications for southeastern Europe, the European Union and the United States. The logic is to secure recognition of the Slavic inhabitants of the former Yugoslav republic as the descendants of the ancient Macedonians as a precursor to the “return” of “their” lands in Aegean Macedonia.

The 1977 discovery of the ancient royal necropolis at Aegae (Vergina) may be seen as a defining moment in the ideology now known as *antikoizatzija*. Only when the sarcophagus of King Philip II was brought to light did the star-burst symbol of Philip suddenly appear in Slavomacedonian publications and heraldry. Although the terms *Macedonian* and *Slav-Macedonian* had been used interchangeably since the early 1900s by writers such as Krste Missirkov and activists such as Mick Veloskey and Stoyan Sarbinoff,¹⁴ from 1988, references to Slavic origins have been systematically phased out, first among the diaspora and later on, within FYROM.

The basic tenets of the modern Macedonian’ movement are often stated with great fervor in diaspora communities, especially in Australia. Since the 1980s numerous demonstrators in Australia have declared, “We will never retreat from Macedonian lands.’ Their views were summarized in “Macedonia: History and Reality” an article written by Gligor Apoleski and published in the *Makedonija Weekly Herald* newspaper of Melbourne where he wrote, “Slavicism is one of the three fundamental causes of the misfortunes and catastrophes of the Macedonia nation. Without the merciless extirpation of slavicism, Hellenism, and communism—these viruses on the body of our nation—there is no change (sic) of building a newborn Macedonia !!!”¹⁵ An Australian tribunal subsequently identified this as hate speech.¹⁶ Nonetheless, Gligor Apoleski is currently the Sydney representative of the AMHRC and an associate of the Washington-based United Macedonian Diaspora which attempts to influence the American congress and American public opinion. Another critical moment in international incidents regarding the Macedonian issue came in 1988. To celebrate the bicentenary of British colonization of Australia, many states from around the world sent special cultural gifts. The Hellenic Republic sent a magnificent exhibition of the antiquities recovered from the Great Tumulus at Vergina.¹⁷ The Ancient Macedonia: Treasures of Greece exhibition, hosted by the Australian Museum in Sydney, was inaugurated by the President of the Republic, Konstantinos Sartzetakis.¹⁸ The Slavomacedonian community received the exhibition with howls of protest and demonstrations in the street outside the venue over the presentation of ancient Macedonian antiquities as part of Hellenic heritage.¹⁹ This episode marked a distinct shift in the nomenclature and symbolism employed by Slavomacedonians to define their own historical origins.

Fabricating History

The misappropriation of Macedonia’s indigenous Hellenic heritage is crucial to the designs the governing VMRO-DPMNE and its supporters have on Hellenic territory.

Before their territorial claims can be taken seriously by the international community, they must first convince the world that the Slavomacedonians are the legitimate descendants and therefore heirs of the ancient Macedonians. This cannot be done without delegitimizing the Hellenism's presence in Macedonia, a feat made impossible by historical data.

The territory claimed by Slavomacedonian groups as "geographic" or "ethnographic" Macedonia only dates to the late Ottoman period (eighteenth century). This so-called "geographic" or "ethnographic" Macedonia roughly correspond to the old Ottoman *vilayeti* (provinces) of Selanik (Thessaloniki), Manastir (Monastiri, modern Bitola) and Kosovo. The earliest references to any kingdom of Macedon, however, confine it to the highlands of the Pindus Mountains. Not until the reign of Philip II (359-336 BCE) did the political domain of the Macedonians extend beyond the Axios (Vardar) River to the east.²⁰ To the Romans, Macedonia was a province that covered their domain between the Adriatic and Black Seas, as far south as central Greece. To the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire, the *theme* (province) of Macedonia regularly moved around the area of Thrace (modern Bulgaria, north-east Greece, and European Turkey). In short, as a geographic area, Macedonia has had very fluid boundaries, one of the factors that accounts for the distinct lack of an ethnographic identity associated with Macedonia until the mid-1900s.

As evidenced by the presence of Mycenaean sites in Macedonia, the region formed part of the northern periphery of the ancient Hellenic world.²¹ King Philip II later established Pella as the capital of Macedon and its cultural center. The earliest recorded history of the Macedonians indicate that they considered themselves the rough and ready frontiersmen of the Hellenic world. The original homeland of the Macedonians lies in the foothills of the home of the main religious sites of the Hellenes, Mount Olympus.²² Amongst the earliest Olympic champions were athletes from the Macedonian kingdom.

The few literary sources have been recovered from ancient Macedonia to date confirm the Hellenic self-identity of the Macedonians. Two of these come from the ancient capital of Pella. The writings of Marsyas of Pella come to us (in part) through the work of Plutarch. As a young noble, Marsyas was taught alongside the heir to the Macedonian throne. His book, *Alexander's Education*, is cited by Plutarch as a source for his own writings on Alexander the Great. The Pella *katadesmos* (curse tablet) is a text inscribed on a lead scroll found in Pella in 1986. Dating to first half of the 4th century BCE, it adds to the weight of evidence that a Doric Hellenic dialect was spoken in Macedonia.²³

FYROM's advocates ignore the plethora of ancient writers who identify Macedon and its people as part of the Hellenic world, preferring to focus on Demosthenes. From his first Philippic in 351 BCE, the orator Demosthenes was warning his polis

that Philip was the main threat to Athens and wanted direct action to protect Athens. Demosthenes' chief internal opponent was Isokrates. In his *Philippus*, Isokrates suggested to the Macedonian monarch that he unite the Hellenic city states and confront the Persian domination of the Ionian cities. Demosthenes' infamous statement that Macedonia was "where a person could not even buy a decent slave" is oft-cited by Slavomacedonian extremists as "evidence" of the ancient Macedonians being distinct from the ancient Hellenes. They neglect to present the political context of Demosthenes' comments, the partisan struggle between Athens and Macedon for supremacy in the Hellenic world.

The Roman conquest of the second century BCE did not affect the cultural make-up of Macedonia. Hellenes continued to be predominant with admixtures of Thracians, Pelagonians, Dardanians, Illyrians, Jews, and Latins (Romans). As being demonstrated by ongoing archaeological excavations throughout the region, the northern frontier of ancient Macedonia did not reach far beyond the districts of Monastiri (modern Bitola) and Stobi, the southernmost reaches of the former Yugoslavia's southernmost republic.

A "call" from Macedonia by Hellenized Jewish communities in the Macedonian port of Neapolis first drew St. Paul the Apostle to Europe. It was in Macedonia that St. Paul secured his first European converts to the new Christian faith, beginning with a woman named Lydia. In testament to the dominance of the Hellenic language in the region, his famed Letters to the Philippians and Thessalonians were composed in Greek. The Christian faith completely re-shaped the Macedonian landscape. Temples and shrines were replaced by chapels, churches and monasteries. Theatres and gymnasia were replaced by schools dedicated to Christian arts such as iconography and manuscript-making.

The medieval period in Macedonia essentially commences with partition of the Roman Empire into eastern and western halves in 395 CE. The Danube River became the border of the Eastern Roman Empire, much later named the 'Byzantine' Empire by British scholars. From the 580s CE, Hunnic and Slavic tribes began infiltrating across it, pushed west and south by migrating peoples from the steppes of Central Asia. Between 597 CE and 678 CE, Slav nomads and their allies besieged Thessaloniki, the Byzantine Empire's second city,²⁴ at least four times. According to the sole contemporary source, a hagiological text, *The Miracles of Ayios Demetrios*, the city was saved due to the intervention of Saint Demetrios who was described as "myrrh-scented" and "the fair."²⁵

With the empire preoccupied with the wars with the Persians to the east, Slav refugees became settlers who were forced into the uninhabited swamp or rocky areas of Macedonia. They were semi-autonomous but compelled to pay taxes to Thessaloniki. Many rapidly became Hellenized, adopting the dress, manners and faith of the "civilized" *Romaioi* (as the Christian Hellenes identified themselves).²⁶

The Bulgars were originally a Tartar people from the Volga River region who adopted Slavic speech and the Orthodox Christian faith once they were settled on the frontiers of the Byzantine Empire. From their initial base around the Ohrida and Prespa Lakes district in northwest Macedonia, successive Bulgarian *khans* and tsars invaded and occupied parts of the Byzantine Empire, including Macedonia. Reaching the peak of their power under Tsars Symeon, Samuil and Ivan (900s and 1000s CE), the Bulgars were brought under control by a combination of assaults by the Byzantines, Serbians and Latin Crusaders. These *Boulgaroi* as they were recorded in contemporary manuscripts, and the other Slavic settlers, are the ancestors of the modern Bulgarians and Slavomacedonians.

A key element of the Byzantine Empire's subjugation of the Bulgars was their adoption of Christianity. Two brothers from Thessaloniki, Methodius and Konstantinos (clerical name Cyril), were the sons of an official of the *theme* (province) of Thessaloniki. Methodius was the elder, born about 815. He later became an official in the *Strymonikon sklavenia* (the Slav-populated areas along the Strymonikon River in eastern Macedonia). Konstantinos was born in 825 or 827, and after preliminary study, went to Constantinople in 843. There he studied under Photios and Leon the Mathematician. He had a meteoric rise, becoming Patriarch Photios' secretary and rhetoric teacher at the University of Magnaura.

In 863, King Radislav of Greater Moravia (modern northern Serbia, along the Morava River) requested from Emperor Michael III in Constantinople the despatch of missionaries to teach his subjects about Christianity. Patriarch Photios appointed the brothers due to their diplomatic experience and knowledge of the Slavic language. They preached in Moravia, developed a script for the Slavic language and translated the liturgical texts. Today, they are regarded as patron saints of the Slavic peoples (Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant alike). Two of their most important students were Saint Kliment and Saint Naum, Bulgarian clergymen and scholars who continued and expanded upon the legacy of Methodius and Cyril.

The medieval Bulgarian empire left a major architectural and literary legacy in south-eastern Europe. Two key texts are the dedicatory inscription of Tsar Samuel at a church in Edessa in western Macedonia, and the dedicatory inscription of Tsar Ioan Vladislav at the fortress of Monastiri (Bitola). Tsar Samuel (ruled 997-1014) wrote: "I, Samuel, loyal to Christ King of Bulgarians and Greeks sent from God. ... I build up this church to exist in the eternity. " ²⁷ The church was built for the sins and salvation of the Bulgarians. The foundations were built in the time of Ieremia, the first Christian in Melnik. His successor, Tsar Ioan Vladislav, left this dedication at his fortress at Monastiri (Bitola), "In the year 6253 [1015] since the creation of the world, this fortress built and made by Ivan, Tsar of Bulgaria, ... as a haven and for the salvation of the lives of the Bulgarians. ... This Tsar was Bulgarian by birth,

grandson of the pious Nikola and Ripsimia, son of Aaron, who was brother of Samuil, Tsar of Bulgaria ...”²⁸

Emulating the actions of Charlemagne and the popes in the West, the Bulgarian tsars began establishing their ecclesiastical independence from Constantinople, through the appointment of clergymen of their own choosing. These appointments posed a serious ecclesiastical problem when the Byzantines re-conquered western Macedonia from the Bulgarians. The active Demetrios Chomatenos, Archbishop of First Ioustiniane and all Bulgaria (1217-1236), set about rebuilding the patriarch’s power in Macedonia.²⁹ The synod of the Archdiocese of Ahrida (1218) decided to depose all bishops appointed by the Bulgars, restoring the surviving Orthodox ones and appointing new ones where the legitimate ones had passed away. All priests were retained in their parishes, regardless of who had appointed them.

During the short-lived medieval Serbian empire, much of Macedonia was ruled from Skopje, the capital of Kralj Stefan Ouresi II Milutin (1282-1321) and his successors. Peaking under Stefan Dushan (1331-1355), the Serbs were overwhelmed by the new power from the east, the Ottoman Turks. In March 1354, Kallipolis, a strategic port on the European shore of the Hellespont was the first part of continental Europe to fall under Muslim control. Gradually, all of Macedonia fell to the nomadic horsemen from Central Asia, culminating with the fall of Thessaloniki on March 29, 1430. Macedonia would remain under Ottoman rule until being liberated in the First Balkan War of 1912.

Muslim Ottoman rule had two important impacts on Macedonia’s demographic, and geopolitical, landscape. The first was immediate: the introduction of an Islamic population into an already religiously and culturally diverse region. The second was more subtle: the political machinations begun by the Islamic sultans designed to fracture of the unity of the Ottoman Empire’s Orthodox faithful along cultural and linguistic lines.

Islam was introduced to Macedonia with the settlement of Ottoman veterans and their families in the most arable parts of the land, the Strymon, Axios and Aliakmon river valleys in the later decades of the thirteenth century. *Gazi* Evrenos, the most famous of the quasi-independent warlords who led the Ottoman conquest of southeastern Europe, founded the city of *Yenice-i Vardar* (modern Yannitsa, Pella Prefecture, Greece) in the late-1300s.³⁰ Throughout the 1600s, as result of a wave of persecutions and forced conversions, sizeable populations of Christians converted to Islam. One group, known as *Valahades*, numbered about 16,000 along the Aliakmon River Valley by the 1910s. As with the remaining Bulgarian-speaking Muslims in the upper reaches of the Axios (Vardar River Valley), the culture of these converts did not differ much from that of Christians.

In the aftermath of the Greek War of Independence (1821-1830), a conscious effort was made by the Muslim rulers to divide and thereby politically weaken restive Christian populations in the region. The Christians of Macedonia were too valuable to the Porte to be allowed to secede as they carried much of the tax burden. The major burden on the Muslims was military service. At that time, Macedonia's villages were almost all linguistically exclusive: Hellenic, Bulgarian, Vlach, Albanian, or Turkish. The major urban centers were diverse, though predominantly Hellenic. A new force in the region was Slav pan-nationalism. This was Moscow's vision of the union of all Slav peoples of eastern Europe under Russian sovereignty. Over the next century or so, the Russian tsar's sought to make this a reality. Rival sultans, kaisers, emperors and prime ministers working just as feverishly to thwart Moscow's designs.

One of the schemes to blunt Russian influence amongst the Ottoman Christians was the *Hatt-i Houmayoun* of February 1856. This imperial Ottoman charter was drafted in response to the national, social, economic and political factionalization of the Empire. It was demanded of the patriarchate that the administration of the Orthodox *millet* be democratized to some extent with a role for laity. The implementation of these changes led to two major tendencies: modernisers who focused on building schools and separatists who stressed ethnic identity. In many communities, modernizers and separatists were the same individuals, using education as a tool to secure their spheres of influence whether Hellenic, Bulgarian, Romanian, or Serbian. Article 10 of the *firman* (order) of 1870 set an "electoral" standard: two-thirds of the Orthodox inhabitants of any given community could secure the transfer of control from one cleric to another.

The final push for a separate Bulgarian national church began on Easter Sunday, April 3, 1860, when Bishop Hilarion of Makariopolis deliberately omitted the name of the Patriarch of Constantinople from the Holy Liturgy. In essence, he was rejecting the Patriarch's authority. Along with two like-minded Bishops, he was exiled to Mount Athos as punishment. Nonetheless, after years of political maneuvering, the sultan issued a *firman* on February 28, 1870, that established the Bulgarian Exarchate independent of the patriarch. According to the *firman*, the Exarchate encompassed the territory of today's Bulgaria, Thrace (without the *vilayet* of Adrianoupolis), and north-eastern Macedonia. In 1874, the western districts of Skopje and Ahrida were added. In the rest of Macedonia, the Exarchate was represented by parish priests.

Two years later, the Holy Synod of the Patriarchate condemned "racialism" as a heresy and proclaimed the Exarchate's personnel to be schismatic. Patriarch Konstantinos V. Valliades promoted all of Macedonia's Dioceses to Metropolises, and despatched young fire-brand patriots as Metropolitans, amongst them

Germanos Karavangelis of Kastoria and Chrysostomos Kalaphates of Drama (later Ayios Chrysostomos of Smyrna).

After almost a year of often bitter fighting, the Russian and Turkish empires signed the Treaty of San Stefano (1878). It appeared as though Moscow's vision of a Greater Bulgarian client state had been realized, but Serbia, Greece, and the Great Powers now combined their forces to block the expansion of Russian influence in the region by drafting and enforcing the Treaty of Berlin the following year. While an independent Bulgarian state was established, it was given borders far smaller than previously envisaged. The region of Eastern Romelia (adjoining the Ottoman Empire) was to become an autonomous state, while the rest of Thrace and Macedonia were returned to the Ottomans, under somewhat, undefined autonomy.

In an effort to realize the dream of San Stefano Bulgaria, VMRO was formed in Thessaloniki in 1893. Founding member Hristo Tatarchev recorded its somewhat vague purposes in his 1928 memoir: "An autonomous Macedonia was easier to unite with Bulgaria later or in the worst case, to play a unifying role in a federation of Balkan peoples." From 1893, the *komitadji* (committee men) unleashed a wave of attacks on Patriarchate loyalists in an effort to alter Macedonia's demographic composition by force. Sixty-four leading Hellene Macedonians, especially priests and teachers, were murdered in 1898/99 alone by VMRO *komitadji*. Organized by the Metropolitan Sees across Macedonia, indigenous Hellene Macedonians responded in kind. Amongst the more famous band leaders were two nashi-speakers³¹ from Florina villages: Kapetan Kottas from Rulia, and Kapetan Vangelis Strebeniotis (born Evangelos Nikolaou from Asprogeia (formerly Strebeno). Bulgarian *komitadjis* and Young Turks regularly joined forces to fight Macedonia's indigenous Hellenes, as evidenced by the assassinations of leaders such as Kapetan Kottas, Kapetan Agras and Pavlos Melas.

The debate over how soon to annex Macedonia to Bulgaria, immediately or in the future, split the VMRO. By 1902, one faction became known as the Internal Macedonia-Adrianople Committee, commonly the Bulgarian Committee. On July 20 by the Old Calendar, the feast day of the Prophet Elijah, VMRO launched an uprising. Beginning in the Monastiri district, it spread across the pro-Bulgarian areas of Ottoman Macedonia (Skopje and neighbouring districts), as far east as the Bulgarian border. The purposes of the revolt were the internationalisation of the Macedonian issue and the destruction of the area's Hellenic communities, including Hellenic-speaking Vlachs. Known as *Ilinden* in Slavomacedonian and Bulgarian circles, the uprising brought brutal Ottoman respond. The Ottoman onslaught on the VMRO rebels, which caught Hellene civilians in the middle, left 201 villages torched; 12,400 homes burnt; 4,694 people murdered; and about 30,000 refugees in Bulgaria.

The Young Turk *coup d'état* and the introduction of a constitution for the Ottoman Empire in 1908 effectively marked the end of the unilateral effort to liberated

Macedonia. In its place came a coordinated assault on the Ottoman Empire by four of the states of southeastern Europe: Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro. Within weeks (October-November 1912), the Ottomans were virtually expelled from Europe, ending centuries of rule.

Bulgaria later launched failed endeavors to conquer the territories along the northern littoral of the Aegean Sea during both the Second Balkan War (February-March 1913) and World War One (1914-1918). These failures contributed greatly to the decline of the influence of the VMRO amongst the Bulgarian population in Serbia. The 1919 Treaty of Neuilly included an agreement on the “voluntary” migration of linguistic, religious and national minorities between Bulgaria and Greece. About 60,000 Slavic inhabitants of Hellenic Macedonia migrated to Bulgaria; another 40,000 had already departed with the retreating Bulgarian army at the end of the wars. About 45,000 Hellenes, in turn, abandoned Bulgarian-ruled territory between 1913 and 1923. The dream of a Bulgarian kingdom extending from the Black Sea to the Pindus Mountain range appeared crushed and many Bulgarian-speaking inhabitants of the newly-formed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, looked to the fledgling communist movements for guidance. The idea of an autonomous Macedonia gained support, particularly in politically radical circles.

It was not *until* the aftermath of World War I that Macedonia, what had only been a topographic designation for a Balkan region,³² was first given a national or ethnic dimension. The Third Communist International (*Comintern*), held in Moscow, adopted positions in favor of a “united and independent Macedonia and Thrace.” The Communist Party of Greece (KKE) officially adopted this platform at its Presidium Meeting of December 3, 1924, part of the ultimate plan for spreading the revolution throughout southeastern Europe and creating a communist Balkan Federation. In a communique titled “Independence for Macedonia and for Thrace,” the KKE Presidium declared that the “national minorities in Macedonia and in Thrace were oppressed...the Hellenic plutocracy dominates a part of the Macedonian and Thracian peoples....Long Live the peasant-workers’ revolution in Bulgaria! Long live independent Macedonia and Thrace! Long live the Federation of Balkan Workers’ Republics! Long live the worldwide proletarian revolution!”³³ Some ten years later, in April 1935, this position was declared erroneous and replaced with a slogan calling for full national and civic equality for all national minorities.³⁴

This early position of the KKE inspired their Yugoslav counterparts to adopt a similar stance in the August 2, 1944 foundation proclamation of the Anti-Fascist Assembly for the National Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM): “It is necessary to unite all the Macedonian people and the three parts of Macedonia within one Macedonian national state...the Macedonians from Hellenic and Bulgarian Macedonia must follow the example of the Macedonians in Yugoslav Macedonia.”

An almost identical phrase is found in the post-1991 constitution of FYROM. In response to the ASNOM.

In response to the original ASNOM declaration, the United States State Department issued a circular that stated, "This government [the USA] considers talk of Macedonian 'nation', Macedonian 'Fatherland', or Macedonian 'national consciousness' to be unjustified demagoguery representing no ethnic nor political reality, and sees in its present revival a possible cloak for aggressive intentions against Greece."³⁵

As US Secretary of State Stettinius was writing his telegram, the rivalry between royalists and communists erupted in a fratricidal conflict that would last five years (1944-49).

A significant aspect of that struggle in relation to Macedonia was that in 1943, as part of its efforts to control the anti-Nazi resistance movement in Hellas, the communist-dominated Hellenic Popular Liberation Army (Ελληνικός Λαϊκός Απελευθερωτικός Στρατός – ΕΛΑΣ) had permitted the creation of Slavomacedonian units within two of its own regiments in western Macedonia. They were known collectively as the Slavomacedonian National Liberation Front (SNOF) and were first formed in Yugoslavia. SNOF rapidly secured full operational autonomy from ELAS and developed a dynamic propaganda wing, cultivating extreme pro-Yugoslav positions. The SNOF views can be seen in the following excerpt from *Bilden (Bulletin)*, "The Macedonia people have the right to be united and this right they have they have secured with the gun. The Macedonian people of Aegean Macedonia, entering the struggle amongst the ranks of the ELAS and fighting against fascism, is simultaneously fighting for its national liberation."³⁶

The SNOF, supported by the communist government in Skopje, made every effort to undermine ELAS in western Macedonia. The SNOF sought to indoctrinate the inhabitants of the region that all *nashi*-speakers were neither Hellenes nor Bulgarians but Macedonians. Moreover, the Hellenes of the region were not really Macedonians. The SNOF stated that it had the right to create an autonomous Macedonia, separate from Greece, yet part of the Yugoslav Federation. A key part of this strategy was the forced removal of children from Macedonia to indoctrination centres across Yugoslavia and the Eastern Bloc.

According to the United Nations' Special Commission on the Balkans (UNSCOB), over 28,000 youngsters from across mainland Greece were taken from their homes and sent across the country's northern frontiers in the later stages of conflict. The primary motivation for these removals, collectively called *paedomazoma* (child gathering) was ideological rather than for the purpose of religious conversion or for reasons of racial "purity." The majority of the removed children were not assimilated into other groups but encouraged to retain their Hellenic identities. The

victim and the perpetrator groups were members of the same ethno-cultural entity: Hellenes divided by politics.

According to the rebels who conducted the mass transfer campaign, the Hellene young were sent to the Eastern Bloc states for humanitarian reasons: to safeguard them from the onslaught of the “monarcho-fascist” Royal Greek Army. In a radiogram sent on January 30, 1948, the rebel command in northern Hellas demanded that the Belgrade-based KKE Central Committee “put the question of helping small children, who suffer famine and other misfortunes, in the Free Greek territory.”³⁷ In early March 1948, the Communist military leader, Markos Vafiades, called for the “evacuation” of 80,000 youths from villages under rebel control in western Macedonia. The Communist authorities in Budapest declared that Hungary welcomed the young Hellenes, “in response to the appeal of the People’s Councils of Free Greece.”³⁸

The Hellenic Liaison Service to the United Nations declared that the removed children were destined for “re-education,” converting the young Hellenes to “communist ideology” and ultimately take Greece into the Soviet bloc.³⁹ Although the UNSCOB was denied access behind the Iron Curtain, individual Western investigators visited some of the centers hosting removed Hellene children in Bulgaria. They all reported a pattern of ideological indoctrination that matched the accusations of the royalist government in Athens.⁴⁰

While there was certainly an element of altruism behind the removals, there are a number of effects of the removals that support ideology as the ultimate motivating factor. Their education in the Warsaw Pact states was typical of the Communist regimes of that time. In two resolutions (November 17, 1948 and November 18, 1949), the United Nations General Assembly called on the governments “hosting” Hellenic children to return them to their families.⁴¹ This was not the only influential body to make such an appeal. In a letter to his Vice-President, Albert W Barkley, United States’ President Harry S. Truman stated that his administration “has exerted and will continue to exert every feasible effort to encourage the repatriation of these children.” The US House of Representatives expressed its support for this outcome in House Resolution 514 of March 22, 1950,⁴² and the Senate followed suit with Resolution 212, adopted on September 13, 1950.⁴³

By 1952, only 684 removed children had been returned to their families. By 1963, some 4,000 had returned home (including a number of children born in communist states to children and teenagers who themselves had been removed). The assertion that the motive behind the removals was purely humanitarian is undermined by the exploitation of the removals as a means of psychological warfare against the Hellenic state, refusal to repatriate children as requested by their families, and by the rebels’ employment of some of the elder teenagers as fighters in the final battles of the civil war.

As noted by Kenneth Spencer, one member of the United Nations observation teams, the key factor in determining the question of how many of the 28,296 Hellenic children were removed voluntarily and how many by force was the status of the parents. As he noted in "Greek Children" in *The New Statesman and Nation*, in pro-rebel villages parents decided for themselves whether to send their children away; in "hostile villages," there was "little doubt that the approach was different and a process of virtual conscription enforced."⁴⁴ Milan Ristic estimated that even in anti-government strongholds along the Albanian and Yugoslav frontiers, "the percentage of the forcibly removed 'voluntary refugees' was extremely high, so that in the towns they amounted to up to 29 per cent of the population in 1948-1949."⁴⁵

Many fathers (in some cases both parents) of removed children had migrated abroad before the outbreak of World War II. This was a common phenomenon amongst economic migrants in the inter-war period. The head of the household would migrate, then bring out his immediate family as his financial circumstances improved.⁴⁶ Some of the forcibly removed children and teenagers returned home in the 1950s and 1960s, either in Greece or in the diaspora. The majority were not so fortunate. A handful who became involved in activities deemed to be "anti-Hellenic" by Greece remained barred from entering their country of their birth. In many ways, this circumstance gave impetus to the modern form of the Macedonian issue as taken. According to Professor Dr. Violeta Achkoska of Skopje's Kyril and Metodij University, "the Refugee Children (Detsa Begaltsi), casualties of the Greek Civil War, were evacuated from Greece in the spring of 1948 ... a greater part of whom, after six decades of exile and organized persecution, are still not allowed to return to their birthplace."⁴⁷ Driven by ideologues in Belgrade, the fruits of this effort began to appear in the 1960s, as the removed Greek children in Yugoslavia who were denied the option of returning to Greece, began to achieve degrees of influence and power within the Yugoslav Federation. A number espoused a Macedonian national identity distinct from Hellenic, Bulgarian and Serbian identity.

Another factor involving ethnic identity is that chain migration from the geographic region of Macedonia had been a feature of daily life since the late 1800s, particularly from the districts of Florina and Kastoria in the Pindus mountain range of western Macedonia. By the 1920s, socio-political organizations had formed in destination countries, such as Australia and Canada. Migrants who identified with the Patriarchate aligned with Hellenism, while Exarchists adhered with the Bulgarian Church. Slavomacedonian organizations completely separate from Bulgarian allegiances did not appear until after Bulgaria's defeat in World War II. In part driven by revulsion at Nazi atrocities and in part by the promise offered by left-wing ideologies, Slavomacedonian activists within Yugoslavia and the diaspora began abandoning Sofia and aligning themselves with Belgrade.

Just as with the Bulgarian Exarchate seven decades earlier, it was felt that the new national identity required a national ecclesiastical institution as one of its basic pillars. The Yugoslav Bureau of Religious Affairs initiated the First Clerical Assembly at a village outside Ahrida (Ohrid) on September 15, 1943. The first National Church Assembly followed on March 4-5, 1945.⁴⁸ The world's first Macedonian Orthodox congregation in 1957 was formed in the inner Melbourne suburb of Fitzroy. Three years later, it acquired St Luke's Anglican Church and converted it to *Sveti Georgi* (Saint George).⁴⁹ An "autocephalos Macedonian Orthodox Church" was not founded in Skopje until 1967.⁵⁰

Scholars have noted that Belgrade's "recognition of Macedonian nationality was meant to diminish, if not invalidate, the legitimacy of any Bulgarian claim on Yugoslav territory or people."⁵¹ To this day, Bulgaria recognizes a Slavomacedonian state, but not a distinct Slavomacedonian identity.⁵² By the 1980s, the founding father of the Yugoslav Federation, Josip Tito was dead. As discussed earlier, new more radical political groups began emerging in the diaspora. The young men who grew up in and around these groups in the United States, Canada, western Europe and Australia, became the political leaders of the modern Slavomacedonian republic. Amongst them are the current Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski,

Concluding Comments

Discussions about FYROM have focused on the formal name the new state should take. Greece believes it is essential that at the very least there must be an indication that this designation does not apply to Greek territory. Designations such as Vadar Macedonia, Northern Macedonia, or Slavic Macedonia would accomplish this. Such names would signal that FYROM does not hold territorial ambitions. That apparently is not the present orientation of FYROM. The ongoing effort of FYROM and its supporters to seek the sole use of the name *Macedonia* is part of a larger strategy to achieve total or partial control over an important province of Greece. In short, the misappropriation of Hellenic and Bulgarian history is only the first phase of a scheme to redraw international borders in Europe.

Regarding the specifics of ethnic continuity, Hellenes by any academic standard have been present in Macedonia since antiquity. *Macedonia*, in fact, is a Greek word as is *Thessaloniki*. Slavs did not enter the region until centuries into the Christian era and there has never been a modern Macedonian state prior to the formation of FYROM. Since earliest antiquity, the people to the north of the mountains have sought access to the fertile plains and strategic ports of Macedonia. In the twenty-first century, this continues to be the case. This is a legitimate need, but the proper course to accomplish this is through regional or bilateral trade agreements and the related diplomatic and cultural relations. The gross attempt to achieve same by

fabricating history would be laughable if the consequences of such folly were not so ominous.

¹ Boris Georgievski, "Ghosts of the past endanger Macedonia's future," *Balkan Insight*, October 27, 2009.

² Sinisa Jakov Marusic, "New Street Battle Splits Macedonia's Capital," *Balkan Insight*, March 8, 2012 <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/new-kind-of-street-battle-grips-macedonia-s-capital>.

³ The monument is officially called Warrior on a Horse.

⁴ Macedonia statue: Alexander the Great or a warrior on a horse? *The Guardian*, August 14, 2011 and "Is Macedonia's capital being turned into a theme park?" *CNN International*, October 10, 2011.

⁵ It also contains interior rooms (including a state-owned souvenir shop), as well as elevators and stairs providing public access to the roof, allegedly intended as space for weddings. Lydia Pavlovčič, "Macedonian Disneyland or fair baroque kitsch," *Delo* (Slovenia) <http://www.delo.si/druzba/panorama/makedonski-disneyland-ali-sejem-barocnega-kica.html>. Accessed November 7, 2012; Dusan Stojanovic "Skopje, Macedonia: Kitsch capital of the Balkans," Associated Press <http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Skopje-Macedonia-Kitsch-capital-of-the-Balkans-3995206.php#next>. Accessed November 9, 2012.

⁶ Ludomir R. Lozny, *Comparative Archaeologies: A Sociological View of the Science of the Past* (ch. *The Macedonian Question*), (New York/Heidelberg: Springer, 2011) p.427.

⁷ "No problem with Macedonia, Just with Nationalist Rhetoric," *Novinite* Sofia News Agency 12 November 12, 2012. http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=145062. Accessed November 19, 2012.

⁸ See discussion of Slavic scholarship in Theodore G. Zervas, *The Making of Modern Greek Identity: Education, Nationalism, and the Teaching of a Greek National Past* (NY: East Europe Monographs distributed by Columbia University Press, 2012), pp. 137-43.

⁹ Bill Schiller, "MACEDONIA What's in a Name?" *Toronto Star*. November 15, 1992, page F.1 <http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/thestar/access/460129761.html?FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&type=current&date=Nov+15%2C+1992&author=Bill+Schiller+TORONTO+STAR&pub=Toronto+Star&desc=MACEDONIA+Wh+at's+in+a+name%3F+Plenty%2C+according+to+residents+of+the+former+Yugoslav+republic+as+they+strive+for+statehood&pqatl=google> Accessed September 12, 2012.

¹⁰ Foreign Information Service Daily Report, Eastern Europe (February 26, 1992).

¹¹ *Toronto Star* (March 15, 1992).

¹² Contemporaries and colleagues of Saints Cyril and Methodius, Clement and Naum were Bulgarian scholars, writers and enlighteners of the Slav tribes. "Ex-Macedonian PM: Đinđić wanted exchange of territory" *b92* June 29, 2012 http://www.b92.net/eng/news/region-article.php?yyyy=2012&mm=06&dd=29&nav_id=81019 Accessed September 24, 2012.

¹³ "Lyubcho Georgievski Seeks the Spirit of Gotse Delchev," *Standard News* August 28, 2007. <http://www.standartnews.com/bg/article.php?article=201326> Accessed September 24, 2012.

¹⁴ It is worth noting that many of these founding fathers of "Macedonian" identity were *nashi*-speakers from Hellenic Macedonia. Missirkov was born in Pella, in the prefecture of the same name. Veloskey and Sarbinoff were both born in villages in Kastoria Prefecture.

¹⁵ The original text has this paragraph in capitals. Gligor Apoleski "Macedonia: History and Reality," *Makedonija Weekly Herald*, August 12, 1992, pages 4-5.

¹⁶ Hellenic Council Of NSW -V- Apoleski, Order Of Ahepa -V- Apoleski [1997] NSW EOT http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/eot_judgments.nsf/ad578df71e9767dfca2567390005c8c9/d85b2e7e0a2ebafd4a25665500071bf9?OpenDocument.

¹⁷ Manolis Andronicos, "Regal Treasures from a Macedonian Tomb," *National Geographic* July 1978, pages 54-77.

¹⁸ *Archaea Makedonia - Ancient Macedonia* was on display at the Museum of Victoria, Melbourne, 25 November 25, 1988-19, the Queensland Museum in Brisbane in February 1989, the Australian Museum in Sydney from, May-July 23, 1989. <http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/202193>. Accessed November 30, 2012.

¹⁹ Slavomacedonian community protests ancient Macedonia exhibition, Sydney, May 1988. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pcOjutMwaNo>. Accessed November 30, 2012.

²⁰ Nicholas Hammond, *A History of Greece to 323 BC* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 516.

²¹ R. F. Hoddinott, "Thracians, Mycenaeans and 'the Trojan Question,'" in Jan G. P. Best, Manny and M. W. De Vries, *Thracians and Mycenaeans: Proceedings of the Fourth Intern. Congress of Thracology* held September 24-26, 1984 in Rotterdam, p. 64. <http://books.google.com.au/books?id=7ucUAAAIAAJ&pg=PA64&lpg=PA64&dq=mycenaeans+macedon&s>

source=bl&ots=Lkmg3oQ--
t&sig=gUOxXZqeYlyHY4bkaCAxrdSgvNk&hl=en&sa=X&ei=yxK4UJfUJPC0iQfN8YHoBA&redir_esc=y#v
=onepage&q=mycenaean%20macedon&f=false

²² Certain Slavomacedonian writers challenge even the existence of ancient Hellenic religion, claiming that ‘a large number of deities and important mythical figures have purposely or unwittingly been misrepresented. Clearly they are not of ‘Greek origins.’” See Aleksandar Donski, “The Myth about the so-called ‘Greek Mythology’” in *The Descendants of Alexander the Great of Macedon, The Arguments and Evidence that Today’s Macedonians are Descendants of the Ancient Macedonians* Shtip 2004, pages 146 to 173, as cited in Risto Stefov *The Little Book of Big Greek Lies – Big Greek Lie No. 3* “The Ancient ‘Greek gods’ were Greek” <http://www.maknews.com/html/articles/stefov/stefov63.html>.

²³ Marcus Alexander Templar “Hellenic Migrations and *Katadesmos*: A Paradigm of Macedonian Speech Translation.” Paper presented to the Ninth Biennial Conference on Greek Linguistics, Department of Linguistics, University of Chicago, October 30, 2009.
<http://epigraphy.packhum.org/inscriptions/main?url=oi%3Fikey%3D153368%26bookid%3D172%26region%3D4%26subregion%3D11%26area%3DBottiaia>

²⁴ Rome itself had fallen to the “barbarians” and ceased being a major centre for almost a millennium.

²⁵ “Θαυμάτων του Αγίου Δημητρίου,” “μυροβλήτην, καλλίνικον και φιλόπατριν Δημήτριον.” This is a collection of speeches of the bishops of the city around the feast day of Ayios Demetrios.

²⁶ The classic example is the *Rhegos* of Rhychinon, Pervound, who preferred city life to his own village.

²⁷ While extreme Slavomacedonian activists on the World Wide Web declare such documents to be forgeries, the academic consensus is that they are authentic.

²⁸ Horace Lunt, “On Dating Old Church Slavonic Bible Manuscripts,” in A. A. Barentsen, M. G. M. Tielemans, R. Sprenger (eds.), *South Slavic and Balkan linguistics* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1982), page 230; Mathiesen, R., “The Importance of the Bitola Inscription for Cyrillic Paleography,” *The Slavic and East European Journal*. 21: 1-2. 1977.

²⁹ “Αρχιεπίσκοπος Πρώτης Ιουστινιανής και πάσης Βουλγαρίας,” the official title of the Archbishop of Ahrida.

³⁰ Following his death there, his family had a tomb (*türbe*) built in his memory. In the early 20th century (1908-10) the tomb received its present-day form, with prominent Neoclassical decorative elements being added during a restoration.

³¹ *Nashi* means “our own people.” *Nashi*-speakers would indicate any local Slavic dialect, of which they are many.

³² Maria Bakalova, “Bulgarian ‘Macedonian’ Nationalism in the Post-1989 Decade,” *New Balkan Politics* Issue 6. September 24, 2012.

³³ Communiqué of the 3rd Special Conference of the K.K.E., Athens, December 3, 1924 (11/26/1924-12/03/1924) *Πιζοσπάστις (Rizospastis)* December 14, 1924.

³⁴ *Ιδεολογική Επιτροπή της ΚΕ του ΚΚΕ, Δοκίμιο Ιστορίας του ΚΚΕ, Α' Τόμος, Σύγχρονη Εποχή, σ.286.*

³⁵ The first part of the document reads: ‘The Department [of State] has noted with considerable apprehension increasing propaganda rumors and semi-official statements in favor of an autonomous Macedonia, emanating principally from Bulgaria, but also from Yugoslav Partisan and other sources, with the implication that Greek territory would be included in the projected state. U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations Vol. VIII, Washington, D.C., Circular Airgram (868.014/26Dec1944)

³⁶ The journal of the NOF, March 15, 1946.

³⁷ Milan Ristovic, *Long Journey Home: The Greek Refugees* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 2000).

³⁸ Jones, Howard (1982).

³⁹ UN, General Assembly, Official Records, UNSCOB Report A/574, 3 sess., Supplement 8, 1948, 18; Annex 2, 29, 31 in Jones, Howard (1985), ‘The Diplomacy of Restraint’, *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, May, 70.

⁴⁰ Following a visit to shelters in Bulgaria which housed removed Hellenic children, British news correspondent, Kenneth Matthews, described the removals as “an act of politically motivated charity.” The boys Matthews spoke to sang, “We’re giving the deathblow to Fascism; we’re marching to civilization.” Many of them orphaned, Matthews recorded that they either did not know their names or were too frightened to say. Matthews, Kenneth 177, 180–182.

⁴¹ Extracts from “Resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations' during its Fourth Session. Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece – 288 (IV),” (November 18, 1949). Noting the report submitted by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of the Red Cross Societies on the question of the repatriation of Greek children, and expressing warm appreciation of the efforts made by the two International Red Cross organizations to facilitate the implementation of General Assembly resolution 193 (III) C, noting that the Greek children have not as yet been returned to their homes.... Urges all the Members of the United Nations and other States harboring the Greek children to make all necessary

arrangements, in consultation and co-operation with the international Red Cross organizations, for the early return to their homes of the children with the aforementioned resolution.”

<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/4/ares4.htm>

⁴¹ The text of House Resolution 514 is: ‘Resolved, That the House of Representatives expresses its profound concern for the thousands of Greek children removed or carried off into countries of eastern Europe by the Communist guerrilla forces during the course of the recent guerrilla warfare in Greece, and requests the President to exert all of his powers, acting through the United Nations and other international organizations and directly with the governments of the countries where these children are located, to the end that these thousands of children shall be speedily returned to their homes and homeland’. Woolley, John T. and Peters, Gerhard *The American Presidency Project* hosted by the University of California at Santa Barbara and now available at the database created by Gerhard Peters. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13766>.

⁴² The text of House Resolution 514 is: ‘Resolved, That the House of Representatives expresses its profound concern for the thousands of Greek children removed or carried off into countries of eastern Europe by the Communist guerrilla forces during the course of the recent guerrilla warfare in Greece, and requests the President to exert all of his powers, acting through the United Nations and other international organizations and directly with the governments of the countries where these children are located, to the end that these thousands of children shall be speedily returned to their homes and homeland’. Woolley, John T. and Peters, Gerhard *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13766>

⁴³ Woolley, John T. and Peters, Gerhard *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13636>.

⁴⁴ Kenneth Spencer, “Greek Children,” *The New Statesman and Nation* 39 (1950) pp. 31-32.

⁴⁵ Milan Ristic, Milan, *A Long Journey Home: Greek Refugee Children in Yugoslavia 1948–1960* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 2000).

⁴⁶ About 100 Australian Hellenic families were divided by the *paedomazoma*. The reunion of removed children with their parents in Australia was even raised in the British House of Lords. (Hansard, HL June 28, 1950, Volume 167 cc1129-31) The children of 24 such families were located in Yugoslavia is reported in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, May 4, 1950, p. 11). That another 100 such removed children were located across six Eastern Bloc is reported in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, May 6, 1950, p. 5. With the active intervention of the Australian government and the Australian Council for International Social Service, 62 removed children were flown to Australia on specially chartered flights from Belgrade in October and November 1950. Eventually, between 300 and 400 of the removed children migrated to Australia.

⁴⁷ Violeta Achkoska, “The Inform-Bureau and the Refugee Children from the Aegean Part of Macedonia 1948 – 1956” (Translated and edited by Risto Stefov).

⁴⁸ “Short History of the Macedonian Orthodox Church,” <http://www.m-p-c.org/history/history.htm>. Accessed November 1, 2012.

⁴⁹ 1960 Procession outside Macedonian Church, Young Street, Fitzroy http://www.picturevictoria.vic.gov.au/site/yarra_melbourne/Fitzroy/21206.html. James Jupp, *The Australian People: An Encyclopedia of the Nation, its People and their Origins* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), page 575.

⁵⁰ “History of the MPC,” <http://www.mpc.org.mk/english/MPC/history-mpc.asp>. Accessed November 1, 2012.

⁵¹ Perry, Duncan M. “Bulgarian Nationalism: Permutations on the Past,” in *Contemporary Nationalism in East Central Europe* Paul Latawski (ed.) (NY: Macmillan Press, 1995) p. 58.

⁵² Andrej Georgiev and Emil Tsenkov, *Bulgaria and the Recognition of Macedonia 1991-1992*. Ethnic Conflicts in Eastern Europe: Security and Human Rights Implications Series. Sofia, Bulgaria: Center for the Study of Democracy, 1993, p. 18.

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