



Kissinger's Encouragement of Turkey's Aggression in Cyprus

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In the early hours of July 20, Turkey's armed forces invaded Cyprus by sea and air,¹ using U.S.-supplied arms and equipment in violation of U.S. laws, the United Nations Charter, the North Atlantic Treaty, and customary international law. Turkey's invasion was the tragic denouement to British and then American interference in Cypriot affairs. This tragic outcome culminated in Henry Kissinger's lawless, arrogant actions and inactions during the week of July 15th. We have seen that Kissinger refused to denounce the Greek junta-initiated coup against Makarios and his government on July 15th as Britain and most other nations of the world, including NATO and European nations, did. In addition, he failed to enforce U.S. laws by immediately halting shipments of arms to the Greek junta in response to its illegal use of American-supplied arms in the coup and the attempted assassination of Makarios. The refusal to halt arms shipments was a lost opportunity to stand against aggression and the use of force in ousting a democratically elected government (I discuss the legal implications of this refusal more fully in chapter 5).

Kissinger's machinations behind the scenes were even more significant. On July 15, Henry Kissinger directed the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations to postpone the UN Security Council emergency meeting on Cyprus from Monday, July 15, to Friday, July 19.² This had the effect of reducing worldwide publicity, downgrading the issue, and giving Turkey time to prepare to invade Cyprus. On July 16, he instructed the U.S. ambassador to Cyprus, Rodger Davies, to meet with the Sampson coup regime's foreign

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minister, Dimitrios Demetriou,³ which could be considered *de facto* recognition of the regime. Finally, On July 17, Kissinger leaked to the *New York Times* that the United States was leaning toward recognizing the Sampson coup government over the legitimate Makarios government in Cyprus, although no final decision had been made. That leak by “high American officials” was the lead story on the front page of the *New York Times* the following day.⁴ All of these items – the instructions, omissions, and delays – in effect gave the Turkish government, which strongly opposed the Sampson coup government, both the time to prepare and an excuse to invade Cyprus. By this time, Henry Kissinger had *de facto* control over U.S. foreign policy, and his actions and deliberate inactions during this crucial week exemplify his willful arrogance and diplomatic incompetence. By failing to obey and enforce U.S. laws against the Greek junta, Kissinger violated U.S. law. The dire consequences of these various machinations and diplomatic blunders would be readily apparent only days later, as Turkish forces continued to spread across Cyprus.

We have also seen that Kissinger rejected the recommendation of State Department specialists to denounce as illegal the intervention by Greek forces and to stand by Makarios. In the leaked story to the *New York Times* Kissinger transmitted his rationale for refusing to intervene or to disavow the Greek junta, actions that State Department staff hoped would serve as a lever to dislodge Ioannides from power: “The Secretary’s rationale. . . was that the United States depended strategically on its air and sea bases in Greece and would do nothing to jeopardize them.” In addition,

For years. . . the Nixon Administration has viewed Archbishop Makarios as the “Castro of the Mediterranean,” who turned too readily towards Communist states for assistance. . . “We think he is finished politically,” a Kissinger aide said of Archbishop Makarios. “He can’t go back to Cyprus unless General Ioannides is thrown out in Athens and even though the junta has problems, that doesn’t seem likely now.”

Kissinger’s rationale does not stand up to analysis. Getting rid of the Greek junta would not jeopardize U.S. bases in Greece. A democratic Greece would retain U.S. bases because it would be in the interests of Greece to have them there. Actually, Kissinger’s failure to act against the Greek junta and apply U.S. military aid and military sales laws to the junta damaged the United States in the eyes of the people of Greece. But even that did not result in the loss of the key U.S. naval and air bases in Souda Bay, Crete, the most important U.S. bases in the Eastern Mediterranean. Events continued to move quickly: on July 20, only five days after the Greek junta’s coup illegally established a rightist government on Cyprus with Nicos Sampson as its figurehead, Turkey invaded.

That same day, July 20, 1974, the UN Security Council adopted Security Council Res. 353, a resolution calling on “all states to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus.”⁵ Turkey had used the illegal Greek junta–initiated coup on Cyprus as a pretext and cited the Treaty of Guarantee under the London-Zurich Agreements of 1959-1960, which established the Republic of Cyprus, as giving it the right to invade.⁶ (It is important to understand that Turkey had no such right under the Treaty of Guarantee or otherwise, as I discuss in detail in chapter 8.) The UN resolution called for a cease-fire, demanded “an immediate end to foreign intervention” in Cyprus, and requested “the withdrawal without delay from . . . Cyprus of foreign military personnel” except those present under international agreement.⁷ Although limited in scope, the resolution was a positive step.

By July 22, when the UN-sponsored cease-fire went into effect, Turkey had captured about 4 percent of the north of Cyprus, with a corridor from Kyrenia on the north coast to Nicosia. The cease-fire was soon violated by Turkish armed forces.⁸ Robert McDonald wrote, “In the first wave some 6000 men with 30 tanks were landed by sea and parachute drop Despite having accepted the [UN] cease-fire, Turkey had reinforced its troop concentration and engaged in a series of advances to make its bridgehead more viable.”⁹

On July 23, the Sampson regime fell.¹⁰ Pursuant to the 1960 constitution, Glafcos Clerides, the President of the Cyprus House of Representatives, was installed as the acting President of Cyprus. Thus, on July 23, eight days after the coup and three days after the Turkish invasion, the legitimate government of Cyprus was restored, which reestablished the constitutional state of affairs prior to the coup. The right of “action” under the Treaty of Guarantee was for “the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.” Although this condition had already been met by the restoration of the legitimate government of Cyprus, Turkey had no intention of stopping its aggression against Cyprus.

Meanwhile, Britain, Greece, and Turkey entered into negotiations in Geneva. On July 30, 1974, the three nations ended the first phase of their talks and signed the Declaration of Geneva, which called for a second cease-fire, a halt to the expansion of occupied territory, and withdrawal of troops.¹¹ Once again, Turkey’s armed forces violated the cease-fire agreement.¹² At this point, Turkey held about 6 percent of Cyprus.

On August 8, Britain, Greece, and Turkey began the second round of talks in Geneva. On August 13, Turkey issued an ultimatum to Greece and Britain to accept Turkey’s proposal. This was tantamount to partition, for six separate Turkish Cypriot “cantons” in which an 18 percent minority would get 34 percent of the island nation, including its most productive areas.¹³ The ultimatum was, in effect, an admission that

the aim of its invasion of Cyprus had not been to reestablish "the state of affairs created by the present Treaty," in accordance with article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee, but rather to conduct a land grab in violation of international law.

That same day, August 13, although there was no evidence of any danger to the Turkish Cypriot community, the State Department spokesman Ambassador Robert Anderson issued a statement, cleared by Kissinger, that the Turkish Cypriots needed more security.¹⁴ Kissinger's blatantly pro-Turkish position was not supported by the reality of the situation in Cyprus. This State Department release was a deliberate tilt toward Turkey, the aggressor. It was an irresponsible decision by Kissinger, a blunder and a clear example of arrogance. The *New York Times* headline stated: "U.S. Backs Turks in Cyprus but Warns against a War."¹⁵

On August 14, Kissinger had State Department Counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt send him a self-serving "Secret/Eyes Only" memorandum recommending that Kissinger "privately assure Turks we will get them [a] solution involving one-third of island, within some kind of federal arrangement."¹⁶ Such a recommendation was obviously illegal and in violation of numerous Security Council and General Assembly resolutions regarding the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Cyprus. Nevertheless, the process went forward.

On that day and following days, the UN Security Council passed resolutions reaffirming its Resolution 353 of July 20, 1974, in all its provisions, including its call "upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus," demanding a cease-fire,¹⁷ and recording "its formal disapproval of the unilateral military actions undertaken" by Turkey against Cyprus. The UN urged compliance with its previous resolutions "including those concerning the withdrawal without delay from Cyprus of foreign military personnel present otherwise than under the authority of international agreements."¹⁸

Also on August 14, three weeks after the legitimate government of Cyprus had been restored, Turkey unilaterally broke off negotiations and launched a second more massive aggression from August 14 to 16. During this second assault, some forty thousand Turkish forces, equipped with two hundred tanks, occupied an additional 30 percent of Cyprus (for a total of about 37 percent), and forcibly expelled more than 200,000 Greek Cypriots from their homes and other properties.¹⁹

Since the 1974 aggression, Turkey has continued to illegally occupy 37 percent of Cyprus. During this nearly four-decade occupation, Turkey has brought an estimated 200,000 settlers/colonists from Anatolia into Cyprus in violation of the Geneva Convention of 1949, Section III, Article 49, which prohibits colonization by an occupying power. The illegal colonists/settlers have been given homes and lands taken from Greek Cypriots and foreign nationals including American citizens. The Turkish

Cypriot newspaper *Yeniduzen* reported on February 14, 1990, sixteen years after the invasion, that of the 160,000 persons who lived in the occupied area at that time, 80,000 were Turkish Cypriots and 80,000 were settlers from Turkey.²⁰

In a report issued October 13, 1975, on the migration of Turks to the occupied part of Cyprus, the *Guardian* listed the rate of migration as 1,500 to 2,500 a month and asserted that the plan was “to implant as many as 80,000” settlers. Neither Kissinger nor anyone else at the State Department made any objection to Turkey’s violation of the Geneva Convention of 1949 by colonizing Cyprus with Turkish nationals. Since the 1990 report in *Yeniduzen*, the steady flow of illegal settlers from Anatolia to Cyprus has continued. The government of Cyprus estimates that, as of 2012, 200,000 illegal Turkish settlers have been planted in occupied Cyprus.

Kissinger and Cyprus: In His Own Words

A Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the State Department regarding Kissinger and Cyprus produced 148 transcripts of telephone conversations out of 3,568 searched from the Kissinger Transcripts. The telephone transcripts are heavily censored and key parts are blanked out. On July 19, 1974, at 8:51 PM, Kissinger had a conference call with Deputy Secretary Robert Ingersoll, Ambassador Robert McCloskey, and Wells Stabler. With the seven-hour time difference, it was July 20 in Turkey, and Turkey had started its invasion of Cyprus. In this telephone conversation, Kissinger mentioned a U.S. “double *enosis*” scheme to divide Cyprus between Greece and Turkey:

Kissinger: Now the other thing we have to keep in mind is to leave open the door to double *enosis*—but I think we better not start pushing that yet. . . . Now what is the judgment of the people about whether we should float the double *enosis* idea now?

Ingersoll: Some people think that is probably the practical thing with the Turks in place.

Kissinger: I think we should go to that after trying the Clerides [solution in which Clerides would be named acting president of Cyprus for six months, after which an election would be held]. It is too dangerous to come up with it now because it will run into massive Soviet opposition.²¹

Kissinger’s reference to double *enosis* is evidence, first, that he had encouraged the Greek junta dictator to initiate a coup against Makarios, and second, that he was encouraging the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey.

Kissinger had several conversations with the Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, his former student at Harvard. He never mentioned to Ecevit that partition of Cyprus was barred by the Treaty of Guarantee and that the United States opposed partition. This fact is to be compared to Kissinger's messages to the Greek junta and to Ecevit that the United States strongly opposed union with Greece.

Nor did he refer to the provisions of the UN Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty against "the threat or use of force." Furthermore, in his conversations with Ecevit, Kissinger never referred to the provisions of the U.S. laws that barred the use of American-supplied arms for aggression. Kissinger's own staff disagreed with this omission. Ambassador Robert McCloskey, Kissinger's media and policy advisor on his immediate staff, stated in 1989 that his second major disappointment regarding Kissinger was the continuation of arms shipments to Turkey after the beginning of the massive second phase of Turkey's aggression. McCloskey stated that during an August 14 meeting in Kissinger's office about how the State Department should respond to Turkey's second wave of aggression, Kissinger went around the room for comments and McCloskey said that he thought "that we should announce that from today, we will suspend any further deliveries of United States military equipment to Turkey. Well, he [Kissinger] exploded."²²

The release of official documents proves that Kissinger knew ahead of time and, in effect, sanctioned the second phase of Turkey's aggression—its massive land grab. On August 13, 1974, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research issued a map of Cyprus, dated August 13, which depicted the lines of the land Turkey's forces would take on the following three days, August 14–16.²³ That map is shown in the frontispiece to this book.

Even without a map, damning evidence though it is, it is not difficult to see that Henry Kissinger's actions – and inactions – added up to support of Turkish aggression. It was inaction on his part that fueled the Greek junta's coup against Makarios. Conversely, Kissinger actively moved in support of Turkey, making, as Christopher Hitchens puts it, "strict and repeated admonitions against any measures to block a Turkish invasion." Hitchens continues,

Sir Tom McNally, then the chief political advisor to Britain's then foreign secretary and future prime minister, James Callaghan, has since disclosed that Kissinger "vetoed" at least one British military action to preempt a Turkish landing. But that was *after* the Greek colonels had collapsed, and democracy had been restored to Athens. There was no longer a client regime to protect.²⁴ . . . And, once Turkey had conducted two brutal invasions and occupied almost 40% of Cypriot territory, Kissinger exerted himself very

strongly indeed to protect Ankara from any congressional reprisal for this outright violation of international law, and promiscuous and illegal misuse of US weaponry. He became so pro-Turkish, indeed, that it was as if he had never heard of the Greek colonels. (Though his expressed dislike of the returned Greek democratic leaders supplied an occasional reminder.)²⁵

Kissinger cared nothing for the territorial integrity of Cyprus, or its independence. He went as far as openly supporting a policy of dividing Cyprus between Greece and Turkey. On August 13, in a meeting at the White House with President Ford, Kissinger said, "Some of my colleagues want to cutoff assistance to Turkey—that would be a disaster. There is no American reason why the Turks should not have one-third of Cyprus."²⁶ For Kissinger, what he perceived as *realpolitik* trumped international law.

My involvement in the Cyprus problem

This outcome is particularly disappointing to me because I was actively involved in the Cyprus problem from 1954 to 1959, supporting self-determination for Cyprus as in the best interests of the United States. I first met Archbishop Makarios in December 1954, when he came to New York for the UN vote on self-determination for Cyprus. In 1971, there was an attempt to assassinate President Makarios. At that time I was assistant secretary of the U.S. Treasury Department in charge of several bureaus including the U.S. Secret Service, whose mission included protection of the president and vice-president. With the approval of the secretaries of state and treasury, I wrote to President Makarios and offered Secret Service assistance to review his protection procedures and make suggestions for improvement. Makarios thanked the U.S. government but noted that Britain had offered similar assistance and its advisors were already on site.

The events of July and August 1974 are vivid in my memory. In the early morning of July 15, an official from the Cyprus Embassy called to inform me about the coup and that Makarios was dead. I went to the embassy to pay my respects. Later that morning, we learned that Makarios was alive after all. On Tuesday, July 16, we learned that the British Royal Air Force had flown Makarios to Malta. On Wednesday, he was flown to London to meet with Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Foreign Secretary James Callaghan.

On Thursday, July 18, I met President Makarios at John F. Kennedy International Airport and went with him to the Carlyle Hotel in Manhattan. I arranged for James Vlasto, former press secretary to New York's governor Hugh Carey, to handle the media for Makarios, as he was front-page news. Makarios spent Thursday evening preparing his remarks for the meeting of the UN Security Council on Friday. The next

day, July 19, he was received at the United Nations as the legitimate president of Cyprus and addressed the UN Security Council as head of state.

On Monday, July 22, I accompanied President Makarios to the State Department, where he met with Kissinger. At the July 18 daily briefing, the State Department had initially pointed out that Kissinger was not meeting Makarios as a head of state, additional evidence of Kissinger's view of Makarios; Kissinger was unilaterally rejecting his status as the elected president of the Cyprus government. At the last minute, on July 22, the State Department reversed its position and said that Kissinger would meet Makarios as a head of state.

While Makarios was meeting with Kissinger, I met with Ambassador-at-Large Robert McCloskey, Kissinger's media and policy advisor on his immediate staff. I knew McCloskey, as I did Kissinger, from my days as assistant secretary of the Treasury (1969–1973) during President Nixon's first term. McCloskey, a career foreign service officer with the State Department from 1955 to 1981, is best known as press spokesman for the department from 1964 to 1973.

During that visit with McCloskey on July 22, I specifically mentioned to him that, under U.S. laws, the United States had to stop sending arms to Turkey immediately. I said that Turkey's use of U.S.-supplied arms and equipment for aggression against Cyprus made Turkey "immediately ineligible" for further military aid and sales under the Foreign Assistance Act and the Foreign Military Sales Act. I told McCloskey that the language of the Acts was mandatory, not a matter of executive branch discretion. McCloskey replied that they would look into it, which in effect meant that he and his superiors would do nothing.

With that answer and Kissinger's failure during the ensuing days to publicly denounce Turkey's actions and to invoke U.S. laws against Turkey for the illegal use of U.S.-supplied arms in the invasion of Cyprus, I decided to press the issue. With American-made bombs dropping from American-made planes on my relatives, I decided to form an organization with a full-time professional staff and an office in Washington, DC for lobbying, research, and think-tank purposes dealing with U.S. relations with Greece and Cyprus. I incorporated the American Hellenic Institute on August 1, 1974, and rented office space at 1730 K Street, N.W., in downtown Washington. That organization led the successful effort by the Greek American community to lobby the Congress to pass the rule of law arms embargo legislation against Turkey.

¹ *N.Y. Times*, July 21, 1974, at A1, col. 8.

² *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 19, 1974, at 1, col. 2.

³ *N.Y. Times*, July 18, 1974, at A1, col. 8.

⁴ *Id.*

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- ⁵ S.C. Res. 353, 29 U.N. SCOR (1781st mtg.) at 7, U.N. Doc. S/11350 (1974) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 353].
- ⁶ Conference on Cyprus, CMND. 679 (1959). See also Cyprus, CMND. 1993 (1960). The Treaty of Guarantee is in CMND. 1253 (1961). The Treaty of Establishment is in CMND. 1252 (1961). See chapter 4 and accompanying text.
- ⁷ See note 5 supra.
- ⁸ *N.Y. Times*, July 23, 1974, at A1, col. 8. See *id.*, July 24, 1974, at A1, col. 8, July 25, 1974, at A12, col. 7, July 26, 1974, at A1, col. 2, July 27, 1974, at A1, col. 2, July 28, 1974, at A1, col. 1, July 29, 1974, at A1, col. 5, July 30, 1974, at A1, col. 3.
- ⁹ *Id.* Robert McDonald, *The Problem of Cyprus*, 18-19 [hereinafter McDonald]. *Adelphi Papers* 234 (1989).
- ¹⁰ *Wash. Post*, July 24, 1974, at A1, col. 4-5.
- ¹¹ Anthony Lewis, *Turks to Remain*, *N.Y. Times*, July 31, 1974, at A1, col. 1.
- ¹² *Id.*, Aug. 1, 1974, at A1, col. 5.
- ¹³ *Id.*, Aug. 14, 1974, at A1, col. 8.
- ¹⁴ Laurence Stern, *The Wrong Horse* 132 (1977) [hereinafter Stern]. Stern was a foreign correspondent for the *Wash. Post*. See generally Christopher Hitchens, *Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger*. (3rd Edition, 1997)
- ¹⁵ *N.Y. Times*, Aug. 14, 1974, at A3, col. 5.
- ¹⁶ Kostas Venizelos & Michalis Ignatiou, *The Secret Archives of Henry Kissinger* 434-35 (2002).
- ¹⁷ S.C. Res. 357, 29 U.N. SCOR (1792nd mtg.) at 8, U.N. Doc. S/11446 Rev. 1 (1974). S.C. Res. 358, 29 U.N. SCOR (1793rd mtg.) at 8, U.N. Doc. S/11448 (1974).
- ¹⁸ S.C. Res. 360, 29 U.N. SCOR (1794th mtg.) at 9, U.N. Doc. S/11450 Rev. 2 (1974).
- ¹⁹ Stern at 132-133. *N.Y. Times*, Aug. 15, 16 & 17, 1974.
- ²⁰ *Yeniduzen*, Feb. 14, 1990.
- ²¹ FOIA request. Collection searched: Kissinger Transcripts. Department of State FOIA Electronic Reading Room, 2004. <http://foia.state.gov/SearchColls/CollsSearch.asp>.
- ²² Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Arlington Hall, Arlington, Virginia, Ambassador Robert McCloskey, May 8, 1989.
- ²³ See page vii for copy of the map; see *The Secret Archives of Kissinger* at 236 (2002); see *Cyprus Weekly*, August 10, 2007.
- ²⁴ C. Hitchens, *The Trial of Henry Kissinger* 86-87 (2001).
- ²⁵ *Id.* at 87.
- ²⁶ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXX, Number 129. Memorandum of Conversation, at pages 423-424, August 13, 1974, 9 a.m.

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